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*  Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. This Article is based on a 2007 
preliminary comment, A Preliminary Comment—The Interplay between State Consent to ICSID 
Arbitration and Denunciation of the ICSID Convention: The (Possible) Venezuela Case Study, 5 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2007), co-authored with Michael D. Nolan. This Article brings up to 
date that earlier comment in light of the denunciation of the ICSID Convention by Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela, as well as discussion of the Preliminary Comment in scholarship.  
 
 This article uses “international investment law” loosely. For a systemic discussion of international 
investment protection in international law, see Frederic G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing 
International Law on Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming 
2013). 
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The last twenty years have seen a radical reversal in the attitudes towards the role of 
private enterprise in the global economy. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, political 
scientists, economists, and lawyers deftly proclaimed the “end of history.”1 Freedom of 
political choice equaled the freedom of markets. Private enterprise, unshackled from the 
tyranny of central planning, was the motor not only of economic growth—it became the 
bedrock of the re-imagined global civic commonwealth. 
The political vision of the late twentieth-century became the foundation of a new world 
legal order. Multilateral trade agreements first conceived after the end of the Second World 
War were given new life in the form of the 1994 Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)—the foundation document of the programmatically named World Trade 
Organization (WTO).2 More permanently than trade, which by its nature is transient, the 
legal protection of investment in host state economies reached critical mass with the signing 
of thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties.3 Much as with the GATT, this 
international legal revolution relied upon a Cold War seed: the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, or “ICSID Convention” 
for short, concluded under the auspices of the World Bank in 1965.4 
The new regime experienced one of its best days on October 20, 1994. On that day, the 
Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments entered into force.5 At that time, 
one of the staunchest intellectual champions of regulatory power of the state over its domestic 
economy abandoned the so-called “Calvo Doctrine,” which provided that “international law 
should not grant more protection to foreigners than national treatment under domestic law” 
and granted U.S. investors international legal rights including the direct right to claim in 
                                            
1. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (2006). 
2.  See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 23, 71 (John H. Jackson ed., 2d ed. 
2008) (“The modern law of international trade may fairly be described as a product of World War II” 
but only after the Cold War did the GATT parties “reach[] agreements that previously eluded them 
concerning so-called ‘safeguards’, and concerning trade in agriculture . . . formally establish[ing] a 
new World Trade Organization, and they created a system of binding dispute settlement designed to 
be applicable to the vast new body of law developed by the Uruguay Round and its predecessors.”). 
3.  See, e.g., STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
(2009); José E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 17–20 (2009) (arguing that 
the conclusion of over 2000 bilateral investment treaties created a new customary international 
law); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 123 (2003); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 427 (2010) (arguing that the conclusion of over 3000 bilateral investment 
treaties created a self-contained regime of international law of investment protection); Stephen M. 
Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law, 98 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27 (2004) (“Customary international law governing the treatment of foreign 
investment has been reshaped to embody the principles of law found in more than two thousand 
concordant bilateral investment treaties. . . . and fashioned an essentially unified law of foreign 
investment.”). For further discussion of the consequence of the conclusion of approximately 3000 
international investment agreements to date, see Frédéric G. Sourgens, Out of the Fog: Developing 
International Law on Investment Protection as Common Law (Feb. 2013) (on file with author). 
4.  See Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention of the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, ¶ 15 (Mar. 18, 
1965), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB.htm. 
5.  Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 
1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992) (entered into force Oct. 20, 1994), available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf.  
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international legal proceedings for impairment of their investments by government action 
before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).6 A novus 
ordo seclorum appeared secured. 
The first decade of the twenty-first century sorely tested the vision and idealism of the last 
decade of the twentieth. Severe economic crises in Latin America were followed by deep 
recessions in the ancestral homes of free enterprise, the United States and the European 
Union.7 Terrorist attacks the world over created new powerful enemies sending people 
scrambling for state protection.8 And a meteoric rise in natural resource prices fueled the 
ascendancy of strongmen in key countries seeking to consolidate strategic assets in their 
control.9 In short, we have experienced what Professor José Alvarez called the “return of the 
state,” asserting significant state control over strategic sectors of domestic economies.10 
The return of the state in the last decade put in play the protections included in the 
programmatic international investment agreements. International investors have filed 390 
claims against host states for expropriation, unreasonable impairment of investments by 
state regulation, and discrimination at ICSID alone.11 The leading claims resolved in the last 
few years under international investment agreements exceeded $100 billion.12 These claims 
made efficacious the new regime of international legal protections by giving individuals 
direct, immediate, and enforceable international legal rights against the host state of their 
investment. More importantly still, these claims provided an international forum through 
which the international community could be made aware of the international illegality of 
blatant political retributions such as the destruction by the Russian Federation of Yukos Oil 
Company.13  
Now that the need for the international legal protections pledged in better days are called 
upon, host states are predictably seeking every mechanism available to escape from these 
protections. Some states threaten to withdraw from the earlier treaties they have struck.14 
Others have followed through and terminated bilateral investment agreements.15 The most 
                                            
6.  Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International 
Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 901 (2011). See also Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 433, 433–35 (1993) 
(reporting on the significance of the transmission by President Bush of the U.S.-Argentina BIT to 
the U.S. Senate). 
7.  Larry Elliott, U.S. and Europe Risk Double-Dip Recession, Warns IMF, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/sep/20/us-europe-double-dip-recession-imf. 
8.  José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 256–57 (2011). 
9.  See, e.g., Randel R. Young & Richard Devine, Managing Risk in Emerging Market Hydrocarbon 
Development Projects, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 30-1 (2009) (describing oil nationalizations in 
Venezuela, Russia, and Bolivia). 
10.  Alvarez, supra note 8.  
11.  Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disp. [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload—Statistics, at 7 (2012), 
available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocu
ment&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English32 [hereinafter The ICSID Caseload—
Statistics]. 
12.  Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard 2011: The Biggest Cases You Never Heard Of, AM LAW 
DAILY (July 6, 2011), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/07/arbscorecard2011.html. 
13.  See Quasar de Valores SICA V S.A. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award (July 20, 
2012), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1075.pdf. 
14.  See infra Part II.A. 
15.  See infra Part II.A.  
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ambitious have attacked the focal point of the investment protection system and denounced 
the ICSID Convention, thereby seeking to deprive investors from the necessary forum to 
bring international legal claims.16 In short, the success of the twentieth-century enterprise 
hangs in the balance. 
If states succeed in their endeavor to gut investment protection, they will have destroyed a 
weight-bearing part of today’s world legal architecture. The reach of law, and access to justice, 
will have been significantly diminished. Accountability and governance will have been dealt a 
heavy blow. But for perhaps the first time in international law, which way the balance tips 
will be decided not in a purely political arena, but in a legal forum. As this Article will 
discuss, arbitral tribunals theoretically and practically must stand at the ready to keep the 
faith of earlier engagements. Tribunals must protect the faith that private actors have placed 
in the law to protect their legal rights. States in short must not be permitted to frustrate the 
very purpose of their promises to put the legality of their actions under neutral, unbiased 
review precisely when such review becomes necessary. 
Part II of the Article lays out the architecture of the international law of investment 
protection. It explains the central importance of the consent to arbitration in international 
investment agreements as the necessary condition for the efficacy of the current international 
legal paradigm. Part III critiques current theories of denunciation of international investment 
agreements as internally inconsistent. Part IV outlines an international obligation model that 
takes investor rights seriously by treating investors as the immediate and intended 
addressees of unilateral acts by the host state to their investment.  
I. The Architecture of International Investment Law 
International investment law protects investments against political risk. In order to do so, 
this branch of international law logically must provide a stable architecture that is not itself 
subject to the very risk against which it seeks to ensure investors. As discussed in the 
following sections, it is this architectural component that current theories of termination of 
international investment agreements typically ignore. 
This part of the Article lays out the development of the international investment law 
architecture chronologically. This chronology shows a trend away from diplomatic protection 
as the principal means of investment protection towards granting investors direct rights. The 
chronology further shows a move away from requiring contractual agreements between the 
state and the investor and towards a broader grant of rights directly to investors through 
standing international instruments.  
A. The Beginnings of the Contemporary International Investment 
Architecture 
The architecture of international investment law rests on post-Second World War 
foundations. Two of the most important early developments for the current architecture of 
international investment law are (1) the failed attempt to bring about a multilateral 
                                            
16.  See infra Part II.A. 
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international trade agreement, and (2) investment agreement and the formation of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
1. The Failed Negotiations for a Multilateral Investment Agreement 
Following the end of the Second World War, several attempts were undertaken to conclude 
a multilateral agreement that would have protected international investments. The three 
principal early agreements were the 1948 Havana Charter, the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft 
Convention on Investments Abroad, and the 1967 Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property (negotiated under the auspices of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)).17 
These three agreements formed the precursor for many of the substantive protections 
found in contemporary international investment agreements.18 The most important 
protection contained in these agreements is the treatment provision that codifies the principle 
that host states must treat foreign investments fairly and equitably.19 Some of these draft 
conventions required host states to keep their contractual engagements towards investors.20 
Some of these conventions further sought to prohibit expropriation without compensation by 
the host state.21 Together, these are the key protections contained in contemporary 
international investment agreements.22 
Critically, the three draft agreements did not yet contain a provision permitting affected 
investors to bring claims directly and immediately to arbitration. The dispute resolution 
mechanism of the Havana Charter calls for arbitration of disputes between the member 
                                            
17.  See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 48–49 (2011); CAMPBELL 
MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 213–14 
(2007); Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where 
Now?, 34 INT’L LAW. 1033, 1035–37 (2000); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs 
Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 67, 72 (2005) (listing additional failed multilateral attempts). 
18.  For a detailed historical discussion, see Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International 
Investment Law, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 33, 51–73 (2009); Franziska Tschofen, Multilateral 
Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign Investment, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 384 (1992). 
19.  Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L LAW. 
87, 89 n.12 (2005); Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, BITs and Pieces of Property, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 
115, 122 (2011); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 43, 45 (2010); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of 
International Economic Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35, 81 n.159 and accompanying text 
(2003). 
20.  See Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1010–11 (2011); Stephan W. 
Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International 
Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 56–57 (2009); Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda 
and State Promises to Foreign Investors before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1605 n.225 and accompanying text (2009); Jarrod Wong, Umbrella 
Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide 
between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 135, 144–46 (2006). 
21.  See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 102 (2d ed., 2012). 
22.  See, e.g., MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 30. 
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states.23 The principal means of dispute resolution under the Abs-Shawcross Convention is 
state-to-state dispute resolution.24 A subsidiary means, subject to consent not contained in 
the Abs-Shawcross Convention itself, permits investors to commence arbitral claims 
“provided that the Party against which the claim is made has declared that it accepts the 
jurisdiction of the said Arbitral Tribunal in respect of claims by nationals of one or more 
Parties, including the Party concerned.”25 The 1967 OECD Draft Convention follows in 
material respect the Abs-Shawcross approach.26  
Despite requiring additional consent to arbitration on the part of the host state, the 
mechanism to provide such a consent is of central importance for contemporary investment 
law architecture, as will be discussed in the following parts of this Article. The comment to 
Article 7 of the OECD Draft Convention states that “[a]cceptance [of jurisdiction] is effected 
by a unilateral declaration.”27 It goes on to explain that: 
 The declaration may be revoked by the Party concerned at any time—unless the 
declaration itself states the contrary. The effect of the revocation is, however, not 
absolute. According to paragraph (c) of Article 7, jurisdiction of the A.T. continues to 
exist for five years in respect of claims arising out of, or in connection with, rights 
acquired while the declaration was valid.28  
Although an important first step toward today’s investment law architecture, these 
conventions fall short of granting foreign investors direct rights. The conventions so far 
exhibit the intent of states to maintain their primacy to use the new instruments as potential 
tools for diplomatic protection;29 alternatively, they are little more than a means for states to 
consent ad hoc to arbitration with specific investors over specific disputes or with regard to 
specific projects. In those instances, the consent would have followed the classic ex ante 
allocative function essentially to provide a means through which to distribute funds for 
specific policy choices with regard to strategic projects in the future.30 
Despite their inherent limitations, the Havana Charter, OECD Draft Convention, and 
Abs-Shawcross Convention were never adopted as multilateral treaties. They all faced 
                                            
23.  Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, in United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Employment: Final Act and Related Documents, art. 93(2), U.N. DOC. E/CONF. 2/78 (Mar. 24, 
1948), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf. 
24.  Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention), art. VII(1) (1959), 
reprinted in U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV. [UNCTAD], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 301, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/DITE/2 (Vol. V) (2000), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/137%20volume%205.pdf [hereinafter 
Abs-Shawcross Convention]. 
25.  Id. art. VII(2). See also Laura Henry, Investment Agreement Claims under the 2004 Model U.S. BIT: 
A Challenge for Sate Police Powers?, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 935, 947 (2010) (noting that the Abs-
Shawcross convention was the first to attempt to create a permanent international investment 
tribunal). 
26.  See OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 7 I.L.M. 117, art. 7(b) (1968), 
available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/internationalinvestmentagreements/39286571.pdf. 
27.  Id. art. 7 cmt. 7(a).  
28.  Id. art. 7 cmt. 7(c).  
29.  See supra notes19–22. 
30.  See W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: 
International Arbitration and International Adjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 41 (1996). 
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significant political opposition.31 This opposition was the strongest amongst developing 
countries.32 The role of the state, or state sovereignty, was as of yet too strong to introduce 
sweeping international legal protections for private enterprise.33 It certainly proved too 
strong to do so on a multilateral basis requiring the consensus of a critical mass of capital 
exporting and capital importing countries.34 
2. Formation of ICSID 
The institution that critically succeeded in pushing open the door to international legal 
rights for foreign investors is ICSID. Unlike the Havana Charter, the OECD Convention, and 
the Abs-Shawcross Convention, the ICSID Convention garnered sufficient support to enter 
into force in 1966.35 Unlike those instruments, the ICSID Convention did not contain any 
substantive protections to which member states agreed.36 Rather, it focused solely on opening 
a forum for investment disputes between states and foreign investors, should the host state 
consent to its jurisdiction.37 
ICSID was formed in response to a series of requests by governments for the President of 
the World Bank to resolve international investment disputes.38 In the most visible dispute, 
the President of the World Bank was called upon to conciliate the dispute between the 
shareholders in the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian government.39 The Egyptian 
government in 1956 nationalized the Suez Canal.40 In response to the nationalization, Great 
                                            
31.  For discussion of the negotiation of these multilateral agreements, see SCHILL, supra note 3, at 31–
64; M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 79–85 (3d ed. 2010). 
32.  See Wong, supra note 20, at 138. 
33.  See, e.g., SCHILL, supra note 3, at 31–44 . 
34.  Cf. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1526 (2005) (“Given 
the difficulties in promulgating sweeping reforms on a multilateral basis, these [efforts to produce 
multilateral investment treaties] were largely unsuccessful.”). See also Salacuse & Sullivan, supra 
note 17, at 72; Leal-Arcas, supra note 18 at 51–73.  
35.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 
14, 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; see also ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 1–10 
(2012); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY xi–xii (2d ed. 
2009) [hereinafter SCHREUER 2009]; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY xvii–xviii (2001) [hereinafter SCHREUER 2001].  
36.  See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 539 (“The key question in drafting the Convention was what 
law an arbitral tribunal should apply when it had an investment dispute before it. The resolution 
adopted in the Convention, was to avoid all attempts to define the substantive obligations between 
host state and foreign investor[s] . . . .”). 
37.  See, e.g., SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 191 (“Consent by both or all parties is an indispensable 
condition for the jurisdiction of the Centre. The fact that the host State and the investor’s State of 
nationality have ratified the Convention will not suffice.); SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 190; cf. 
LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 540 (noting that during the early history of the ICSID Convention’s 
existence “[n]otwithstanding the fact that joining the ICSID Convention did not constitute consent 
to arbitration of any given investment dispute, present or future, there was a widespread 
perception, particularly among the states of Latin America . . . that if states did sign and ratify the 
Convention, they would be under pressure to consent to arbitration”). 
38.  See A. Broches, Note transmitted to the Executive Director, (Jan. 19, 1962), in 2-1 HISTORY OF THE 
ICSID CONVENTION 2–7 (1968); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 456. 
39.  See Broches, supra note 38, at 2–7. 
40.  See Egypt Seizes Suez Canal, BBC NEWS (July 26, 1956), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm. 
Keep the Faith 
345 
Britain and France sent troops to Egypt to reclaim the Canal.41 Following diplomatic 
intervention by the United States, Great Britain and France withdrew their forces.42 
Shareholder representatives for the stakeholders in the Suez Canal Company resolved their 
dispute with Egypt in an amicable fashion with the help of the World Bank.43 
In another large-scale dispute, the President of the Bank was called upon to resolve a 
dispute between a class of French bondholders and the City of Tokyo.44 The City of Tokyo 
Bonds case was a dispute between the City of Tokyo and French holders of 1912 city bonds, 
restructured in 1937, regarding the effects of post-Second World War restructurings of 
Japanese debt held by former Japanese enemies.45 When the dispute could not be amicably 
resolved, the parties submitted it to the President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, for 
conciliation.46 On November 5, 1960, the dispute was settled by an agreement of the parties 
with the help of the World Bank’s legal staff, whose assistance was garnered through Black’s 
proposed payment schedule for the Metropolis of Tokyo.47 The schedule was “based on the 
sum of 252.57 (New Francs) having a gold content of 0.18000 grams per franc for each 500-
franc bond with all coupons matured since 1928, calculated as of March 1, 1960.”48 
                                            
41.  Allied Forces Take Control of Suez, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 1956), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/low/dates/stories/november/6/newsid_3115000/3115888.stm. 
42.  Jubilation as Allied Forces leave Suez, BBC NEWS (December 23, 1956), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/23/newsid_3294000/3294305.stm. 
43.  Egypt to Meet Suez Canal Shareholders: Talks in Rome Next Month, GLASGOW HERALD, Jan. 24, 
1958, at 7, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2507&dat=19580124&id=1ndAAAAAIBAJ&sjid=o6MMAA
AAIBAJ&pg=4696,2665434. For a discussion of the historical background of the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal, see Note, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 70 HARV. L. REV. 480 (1957). 
The note opines on the adequacy of compensation based on the price of stock on the Paris Exchange 
on the day the expropriation would go into effect (as offered by Egypt) in light of Britain’s 
withdrawal of forces from Egypt two years prior and the significant downward adjustment of the 
share price on the Paris Exchange following the withdrawal of forces. The discussion therefore 
suggests that the shares in questions were actively traded as financial instruments on an exchange 
prior to the nationalization of the Canal. 
44.  See Broches, supra note 38, at 2–7. 
45.  See MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 83 
(2011). 
46.  WORLD BANK GROUP ARCHIVES, WORLD BANK GROUP HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY 82–83, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARCHIVES/Resources/WB_Historical_Chronology_1944_200
5.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
47.  Id. See also T.M.C. Asser, The World Bank, 7 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 209 (1972) (“The Legal 
Department has also assisted the Bank and its President in the settlement of investment disputes 
between member countries or between a member country and private parties, such as the disputes 
involving the Indus Basin, the Suez Canal, the sequestration of British property in the United Arab 
Republic, and the City of Tokyo Bonds of 1912.”). The author of the article was a lawyer in the legal 
department of the World Bank at the time of writing the article. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme 
court for judicial matters] com., Mar. 7, 1967, Bull. civ. IV, No. 105 (Fr.), available at: 
http://legimobile.fr/fr/jp/j/c/civ/com/1967/3/7/6974678/.  
48.  WORLD BANK GROUP ARCHIVES, supra note 46, at 83. See also Asser, supra note 47, at 209 (“The 
Legal Department has also assisted the Bank and its President in the settlement of investment 
disputes between member countries or between a member country and private parties, such as the 
disputes involving the Indus Basin, the Suez Canal, the sequestration of British property in the 
United Arab Republic, and the City of Tokyo Bonds of 1912.”). Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme 
court for judicial matters] com., Mar. 7, 1967, Bull. civ. IV, No. 105 (Fr.), available at: 
http://legimobile.fr/fr/jp/j/c/civ/com/1967/3/7/6974678/.  
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Although the project began as an attempt to streamline the World Bank’s role in resolving 
investment disputes,49 from its very inception the Centre was intended to remedy the trend of 
states frustrating their own arbitral engagements when investors sought to call upon them.50 
Such attempts were common in large-scale project disputes at the time the ICSID Convention 
was first conceived.51 From the earliest drafts, the purpose was to secure that state arbitral 
consents would become international obligations of the state giving them under an 
international treaty, namely the ICSID Convention.52 This mechanism was intended to 
strengthen both contractual consents included in investment agreements and consents given 
independently of a contractual relation with the investor in international treaties or domestic 
investment legislation.53 
                                            
49.  Broches, supra note 38 at 7. 
50.  Id. at 2 . 
51.  See John T. Schmidt, Arbitration under the Auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of 
Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT’L L.J. 90, 90 n.1 (1976) (providing a list of 
cases in which host states have effectively frustrated their arbitration consent in disputes with 
foreign investments in the thirty years prior to negotiation of the ICSID Convention); cf. 
Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
317 (1988) (analyzing in detail the practice of arbitral tribunals constituted under production 
sharing and economic development agreements); Note, Foreign Seizure of Investments: Remedies 
and Protection, 12 STAN. L. REV. 606, 633 (1960) (stating that “if the state party is unwilling to 
contest a particular claim in spite of an agreement to arbitrate and if the jurisdictional clause of the 
agreement provides for a tribunal to which each party must appoint a member, such unwillingness 
may effectively prevent arbitration. Therefore the individual should consider the possibility of 
inserting an ‘airtight’ arbitration provision, one which can operate without the cooperation of one of 
the parties”). 
52.  See, e.g., Draft Convention prepared by the General Counsel and transmitted to the Executive 
Directors, Article II(1), (June 5, 1962), in 2-1 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 
22 [hereinafter Draft Convention]; cf. President’s Note to the Executive Directors, in 2-1 HISTORY OF 
THE ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 5 (explaining that “[w]hile, as stated, the international 
agreement establishing the Center would not of itself oblige members to submit to its jurisdiction, 
the agreement would provide . . . that once a State had voluntarily agreed to submit a specific 
dispute or group of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Center, this agreement would be a binding 
international obligations”). 
53.  See, e.g., Remark of Mr. Donner, (May 6, 1963), in 2-1HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION, 
supra note 38, at 91 (discussing Germany’s nascent BIT program); Remark of A. Broches, 
Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole (May 28, 1963), in 2-1HISTORY OF 
THE ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 93 (“Mr. Donner’s point regarding avoidance of 
interference with existing bilateral agreements on foreign investment would be met in the next 
draft”) [hereinafter Broches Memorandum May 28, 1963]; First Preliminary Draft of a Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Article 
II(2) (Aug. 9, 1963), in 2-1 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 38, at148 (making 
express that consent of the state can be given independently from the consent of the investor) 
[hereinafter First Preliminary Draft]; Letter addressed to the Bank from the Federal Ministry of 
Finance of the Republic of Austria (Nov. 13, 1963), in 2-2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID 
CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 670 (raising the concern that a later intermediate draft “no longer 
provides explicitly for the possibility of general statements of submission, as contained in Article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the first draft”); A. Broches, Memorandum from the General Counsel and Draft 
Report of the Executive Directors to Accompany the Convention (Jan. 19, 1965), in 2-2 HISTORY 
OF THE ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 956 (“Nor does the Convention require that the 
consent of both parties to be expressed in a single document. Thus, a host state might in its 
investment promotion legislation offer to submit disputes arising out of certain classes of 
investments to the jurisdiction of the Centre, and the investor might give his consent by accepting 
the offer in writing.”) [hereinafter Broches Memorandum Jan. 19, 1965]. 
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The ICSID Convention gave teeth to the international obligation to abide by consents 
through its mechanism for the enforcement of arbitral awards. Article 54(1) of the ICSID 
Convention provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered 
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”54 The broad 
exception from sovereign immunity is limited only with regard to immunity from execution, 
thus emphasizing further that jurisdictional immunities are waived.55 The ICSID Convention 
thus provided a forum with significant advantages to foreign investors over existing fora that 
did not contain such sovereign immunity waivers.56 
The structure of the ICSID Convention confirms the critical nature of consent in resolving 
investment disputes in international law. The ICSID Convention elevates the obligation owed 
to an investor to an enforceable international legal obligation because of the consent provision 
giving the investor a direct right of action.57 Without the consent provision, the investor 
would lack an international legal right to enforce legal obligations. Through it, the investor 
acts completely independent of the support—or disapproval—of its home state.58 This 
mechanism formed the baseline from which mature international law on international 
investment disputes departed.59 
3. The Project-Specific Paradigm 
Investment protection in practice remained project-specific through much of the Cold War. 
The principal means through which investors (as opposed to their home states) obtained 
investment protection were either direct contractual undertakings from the host state or by 
means of political risk insurance (in which case the investor’s home state would recover 
moneys expended through its own claim mechanisms).60  
                                            
54.  ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at art. 44(1).  
55.  Id. art. 55. 
56.  But see Edward Baldwin et al., Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 1 (2006) 
(discussing the means available to states to frustrate enforcement of ICSID awards even in light of 
the strong enforcement provisions of the ICSID Convention); cf. George K. Foster, Collecting from 
Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforcing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments 
Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 665, 702–06 (2008); Charity L. Goodman, Unchartered Waters: Financial Crisis and 
Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 449 (2007) (discussing 
enforcement in the context of Argentina’s spirit defense against execution on a significant number of 
ICSID awards against it). 
57.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 35, arts. 25(1) (jurisdiction of the Centre depends upon consent), 
52(2) (annulment is available if a tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers), 53(1) (award is binding 
to the parties to the dispute), 54(1) (award must be enforced in each contracting state).  
58.  But cf. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of 
States, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (2010) (arguing for a greater role of states in the shaping of the 
international legal rights of investors acquired through international investment treaties); see also 
Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2011) (discussing why 
international law is more frequently generated further away from the traditional statist paradigm). 
59.  But cf. Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775 (2012) 
(submitting that investment arbitration tribunals helped to usher in a new mode of effective, 
compulsory public international law adjudication). 
60.  For a full discussion of early investor options and their limitations, see, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 26–43. 
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a. Investment Agreements 
A significant number of large-scale investment agreements in the Cold War were protected 
through express contractual undertakings from the host state. The main provisions in such 
agreements addressing political risk are so-called stabilization clauses.61 Such stabilization 
agreements can operate in different manners: they may freeze the regulatory environment in 
whole or in part,62 create a complex balance of rights and obligations that adapt to market 
conditions,63 or impose open-ended obligations seeking to stabilize an overall “investment 
environment.”64  
Dispute resolution practice under such agreements confirmed that the agreements 
conferred direct international legal rights upon the investor against the state. Such 
agreements thus absolve investors of the risk of foreign policy discretion of their home state 
still applicable in the realm of diplomatic protection. The Lena Goldfields arbitration provides 
the classic example for the internationalization doctrine.65 The Lena Goldfields arbitration 
concerned a Siberian mining concession granted by the Soviet government during the time of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP).66 Following a policy change abandoning the NEP, Soviet 
officials withheld vital services to be performed under the contract from the project, raided 
the property under concession, and prosecuted Goldfields’ employees for counter-
                                            
61.  See, e.g., Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions, 30 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 217 (2002). 
62.  See, e.g., Julián Cárdenas García, Rebalancing Oil Contracts in Venezuela, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 235, 
258 (2011) (discussing freezing agreements under Venezuelan law, but noting that they have not 
been implemented); A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Issue of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering 
and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas Industry, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 79, 96 (2010) 
(discussing the classic freezing stabilization agreement); Evaristus Oshionebo, Stabilization Clauses 
in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts: Legal, Economic and Social Implications for Developing 
Countries, 10 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 1 (2010) (discussing the history of freezing 
stabilization clauses); Catherine J. Boggs, Project Management: A Smorgasbord of International 
Operating Risks, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. PAPER NO. 13, at 5 (2008) (noting that “[t]hese kinds of 
‘freezing’ clauses are often found in older stability agreements”); Miguel I. Rivero Betancourt, 
Compared Study of Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela’s Legal Framework on Natural Gas (Upstream 
Activities), 2 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. PAPER NO. 19 (2007). 
63.  See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 62, at 5 (noting that equilibrium agreements are currently the more 
typical form of stability agreements); Maniruzzaman, supra note 62, at 96 (discussing equilibrium 
clauses); A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, National Laws Providing for Stability of International Investment 
Contracts: A Comparative Perspective, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 233 (2007).  
64.  Richard J.B. Price et al., Managing Multi-Country International Risk: What to Look for before 
Investing, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. PAPER NO. 12, § V(B) (“For example, an investor should 
consider seeking a stabilization clause, by which the host government undertakes not to take any 
action that would undermine the value or operation of a foreign investment. These clauses typically 
include prohibitions against enacting or amending laws that would alter the ‘investment 
environment’ present at the time the investment was made, and often fix royalties and other 
taxes.”). For a critique of this categorization of stabilization agreements, see Peter D. Cameron, 
Stability of Contract in the International Energy Industry, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 305 
(2009). 
65.  See, e.g., Coale, supra note 61, at 227 (“As a result of the interaction between the clauses of the 
agreement, the Court of Arbitration determined for the first time that a contract between a private 
party and a sovereign state might be internationalized.”); see also Yackee, supra note 20, at 1575–
77. 
66.  Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 
CORNELL L.Q. 31, 33 (1950); see also V.V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical 
Roots of Three Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1998). 
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revolutionary activity, leading Goldfields to abandon the project.67 Although the Soviet Union 
initially participated in the constitution of the tribunal, it later withdrew from the 
proceedings.68 The tribunal derogated from a Soviet choice of law provision—on the basis of 
which the Soviet Union arguably would have prevailed—and found liability was ultimately 
found on the basis of general principles of law.69 
Dispute resolution practice under these agreements has awarded foreign investors relief in 
cases of termination of concessions.70 Alternatively, the investor’s producing asset was 
nationalized outright or investor rights under investment agreements were severely 
impaired.71 Because of the severity of the interference with the investor’s contractual rights, 
the liability imposed by host states was in fact premised upon facially inconsistent rationales 
that all endorsed the same result; namely, even if the contracts were treated as 
administrative engagements subject to administrative law oversight, the outright seizure of 
the investment still constituted a fundamental breach no matter the discretion afforded the 
host state agencies.72  
The classic decisions rendered under investment agreements did not squarely address 
claims for impairment of investments through change in regulation but concerned instead 
obvious breaches of the investment agreement as a whole.73 An outright taking of a 
concession, or outright breach of a fundamental right bestowed upon an investor in the 
concession, is an obvious example of state action that is both a breach of the stabilization 
clause and a fundamental breach of contract irrespective of stabilization clauses.74 That said, 
much of pre-bilateral investment treaty (BIT) jurisprudence could be extended to support 
invocation of investment agreements in the context of substantial regulatory impairment of 
covered investments that did not rise to the level of an out-and-out taking.75  
                                            
67.  Nussbaum, supra note 66, at 33. 
68.  Id. at 34. 
69.  See id. 
70.  See Coale, supra note 61, at 226–36; see also Christopher Greenwood, State Contracts in 
International Law—The Libyan Oil Arbitrations, 1982 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 27; Robert B. von Mehren 
& P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations between States and Foreign Private Parties: The 
Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1981); Yackee, supra note 20, at 1575–601. 
The decisions did not exclusively award monetary compensation but at times offered declaratory 
relief. For further discussion, see Sourgens, supra note 3. 
71.  Coale, supra note 61, at 226–36; see also Yackee, supra note 20, at 1575–601; Christopher 
Greenwood, supra note 70; von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 70.  
72.  Coale, supra note 61, at 226–36; see also Yackee, supra note 20, at 1575–601; Christopher 
Greenwood, supra note 70; von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 70. 
73.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Wäelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: 
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 215, 246 (1996) (“In all these 
arbitral awards, compensation was payable for revocation/breach of the investment agreement, with 
the specific issue of the stabilization clause largely obscured in the ratio decidendi. Even so, these 
cases clearly illustrate a lack of consistency in international jurisprudence, which in turn is 
indicative of the uncertainty which currently prevails over the precise status of the stabilization 
clause under international law.”). 
74.  Id. 
75.  See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1958) (pacta 
sunt servanda premised in general principles of law enforced in the context of exclusive grant to ship 
oil); Czechoslovakia v. Radio Corporation of America: Arbitration Case of the Administration of Posts 
and Telegraphs of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, 30 AM. J. INT’L L. 523 (1936) (pacta sunt servanda 
as duty not to compete with telegram joint venture); Julien Cantegreil, The Audacity of the 
Texaco/Calasiatic Award: René-Jean Dupuy and the Internationalization of Foreign Investment 
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In sum, early arbitral decisions involving investment agreements point the way forward in 
significant matters. They recognize direct international legal rights vested in international 
investors rather than their home states.76 The decisions developed those rights through 
general principles of law while straddling existing principles of customary international law 
and the lex mercatoria.77 They granted investors meaningful monetary and non-monetary 
relief.78  
And yet these early decisions evidence the limits of the project-specific model. Rights were 
selectively granted to few investors.79 Despite the obvious limitations of these rights, host 
states nevertheless avoided abiding them by invoking state sovereignty—a plea that could 
leave investors without a means ultimately to enforce an arbitral award in their favor.80 
Without a reliable enforcement mechanism of arbitral awards, international legal rights 
bestowed upon international investors ran the systemic risk of under-enforcement.  
Further, the conclusion of investment agreements was not without practical difficulties. 
One such difficulty was that most investors had limited leverage to negotiate agreements. In 
fact, domestic legislation frequently defined the scope of agreements into which a host 
country would enter.81 A further difficulty was and remains that “it is not unusual for a 
country to demand renegotiation of the terms of the agreement as the economics of the 
country or the project change over time.”82 From a practical point of view, investment 
agreements were and are important, but arguably not the most stable set of protections for 
international investors.  
                                                                                                                  
Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 441, 442 (2011) (“The willingness of Professor René-Jean Dupuy, designated 
as sole arbitrator by the President of the International Court of Justice, to decide the case en droit 
and not to shy away from substantively innovative doctrinal choices has helped to make Texaco a 
keystone in the construction of the modern international law of foreign investment. The Texaco 
award must therefore be read as forward-looking. The shift from the traditional hegemony of 
national jurisdiction in international investment law to the internationalization of international 
contracts is Dupuy's long-lasting contribution to international law doctrine . . . .”); Veeder, supra 
note 66 (pacta sunt servanda as a general principle of law); Yackee, supra note 20, at 1575–601. 
76.  See, e.g., Coale, supra note 61, at 227 (“As a result of the interaction between the clauses of the 
agreement, the Court of Arbitration determined for the first time that a contract between a private 
party and a sovereign state might be internationalized.”); see also Yackee, supra note 20, at 1575–
77. 
77.  See Nussbaum, supra note 66; Veeder, supra note 66. 
78.  See Sapphire Int’l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 190 (Arb. Trib. 1963) 
(awarding $2,650,874 in compensation); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 
I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1958) (declaratory relief) 
79.  See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 42–43 (quoting a 1968 World Bank report that “[i]n an 
attempt to overcome these difficulties, some investors, mostly large corporations especially in the 
field of extractive industry, have been able to negotiate arbitration agreements with host 
Governments, providing for detailed rules regarding the selection of arbitrators, the arbitral 
procedure and, in some cases, the law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal. It is quite clear that 
only a few investors can be in a position to negotiate such agreements.”). 
80.  See id. (“Within the courts of the host country a variety of barriers such as partiality of the forum, 
immunity of the state, adoption of the Calvo doctrine and the inefficiency of such courts often left no 
meaningful means of redress for the aggrieved foreign investor.”). 
81.  For a current example, see Venezuelan Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de Ley de Promocion y 
Proteccion de Inversiones, Decreto No. 356, art. 17 (Oct. 3, 1999), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=130142. 
82.  Boggs, supra note 62, at 6. 
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b. Political Risk Insurance 
Apart from securing investments against political risks through investment agreements, 
the main means of protecting investments against political risks prior to the BIT era was 
through political risk insurance. In the United States, the governmental provider of political 
risk insurance initially was U.S. AID, followed by the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC).83 Political risk insurance traditionally was made available for 
expropriation, political violence, and inconvertibility.84 
The main protection actually invoked by investors covered by OPIC concerned 
inconvertibility of foreign currency.85 Inconvertibility of foreign currency occurs when there is 
either active blockage of a currency exchange transaction or passive blockage of such a 
transaction.86 An active blockage occurs when the central banking authorities in the host 
country expressly prohibited the transfer of currency.87 A passive blockage occurs when the 
central banking authorities simply failed to make available foreign exchange at the official 
rate of exchange.88  
OPIC inconvertibility protection, in practice, protected investors against regulatory 
changes relating to foreign exchange.89 Insurance coverage froze the foreign exchange rate in 
place at the time the insurance contract was taken out.90 If a regulatory change impaired the 
investor’s ability to repatriate either profits or repayments on loans, the impairment value 
would be covered by OPIC insurance.91 
The expropriation cover was significantly broader than requiring the outright 
nationalization of covered investments. OPIC’s test was whether the host state’s action 
deprived the investor of a fundamental right in the investment.92 In practice, this meant that 
                                            
83.  See 1 REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION DETERMINATIONS xx–xxi (Mark 
Kantor et al. eds., 2011) (providing historical introduction to OPIC and U.S. public political risk 
insurance) [hereinafter REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT]. 
84.  See Michael Nolan, Frédéric Sourgens, & Mark Rockefeller, Public Contract Guarantees by National 
Institutions, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS (Mathias Audit & Stephan Schill 
eds.) (forthcoming 2013); S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC, MIGA, 
EXIMBANK and Other Providers, 5 PACE INT’L L. REV. 59, 64, 76–80 (1993); Robert B. Shanks, 
Insuring Investment and Loans against Currency Inconvertibility, Expropriation, and Political 
Violence, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 417 (1986). 
85.  See REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 83. 
86.  See Nolan, Sourgens, & Rockefeller, supra note 84. 
87.  See, e.g., General Signal Corp. (Argentina: 1973), in REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, 
supra note 83, at 160–66 (resolving active blockage claim).  
88.  See, e.g., Bank of America (Vietnam: 1970), in REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra 
note 83, at 45–46 (resolving passive blockage claim).  
89.  See, e.g., REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 83, at xlviii (discussing Philippine 
inconvertibility claims). 
90.  Id. 
91.  See, e.g., Bank of America (Vietnam: 1973(I)), in REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra 
note 83, at 126–35 (resolving claim regarding change in foreign exchange regulation imposing 
additional limitation on repatriation of profits); General Signal Corp. (Argentina: 1973), in REPORTS 
OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 83, at 160–66 (resolving active blockage claim). 
92.  See, e.g., Revere Copper and Brass (Jamaica: 1978), in REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, 
supra note 83, at 740–69. For a discussion of Revere Copper, see R. Doak Bishop et al., Strategic 
Options Available when Catastrophe Strikes the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 635, 685–86 (2001); David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts between Investor Rights and 
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OPIC compensated investors that lost control over their investment—even if the investor still 
maintained legal ownership and could enforce a right to receive some payments under 
relevant investment agreements.93 In fact, the frustration of key engagements made by the 
host state government enticing an investment to be made would arguably rise to the level of 
an expropriation in the context of OPIC’s claim practice.94  
National political risk insurance carriers addressed and continue to address the leverage 
problem posed by investment agreements. OPIC provided and continues to provide coverage 
for projects in countries with which the United States has a treaty providing for certain rights 
of recovery in case of an insurance pay-out.95 The home state, of course, has significantly 
better leverage to negotiate such coverage with the host state than most any single investor 
would. The OPIC model therefore provided some improvement to the leverage problem.96  
That being said, the problem of the political risk insurance model was that it again 
deprived the investor of a direct right of action against the host state. The political risk 
insurance model is essentially premised upon diplomatic protection as the chief mechanism to 
address political risk.97 In a world of growing global trade and investment, a system that is 
dependent on such diplomatic protection suffers from significant inefficiencies, because, for 
instance, it limits the places in which coverage will be made available.98 
B. Setting Up the BIT Paradigm 
The BIT era began in 1959 with the conclusion of the Germany-Pakistan BIT.99 BITs, 
considered a class within International Investment Agreements (IIAs) generally, slowly took 
the place of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation.100 The pace at which similar 
treaties were concluded was comparatively slow prior to the end of the Cold War: from 1980 
to 1990, countries concluded approximately 385 BITs.101 The United Nations Conference on 
                                                                                                                  
Environmental Regulation under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651, 720–22 
(2001). 
93.  See, e.g., International Bank of Washington (Dominican Republic: 1971), in REPORTS OF OVERSEAS 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 83, at 59–89 (defining expropriation standard in the context of 
effective control over the investment). 
94.  See, e.g., Revere Copper and Brass (Jamaica: 1978), in REPORTS OF OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, 
supra note 83, at 740–69.  
95.  Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from 
Stabilization Clauses, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 261, 275 (2011). 
96.  See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 492 (2008) (“For many years, OPIC has boasted of its 
high recovery rate—95 percent of the amounts accepted—which observers credit to its leverage as 
an arm of the U.S. government.”(footnote omitted)). 
97.  Id. 
98.  As OPIC states on its website, “From time to time, statutory and policy constraints may limit the 
availability of OPIC programs in certain countries.” OPIC, Finance Eligibility Checklist, available at 
http://www.opic.gov/doing-business-us/applicant-screener/finance-eligibility-checklist (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2013). 
99.  See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 21, at 6 (“The era of modern investment treaties had 
begun in 1959 when Germany and Pakistan adopted a bilateral agreement which entered into force 
in 1962.”). 
100.  See, e.g., id. at 17–30 (providing a brief history of IIAs); see also DUGAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 51–
68; MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26–27. 
101.  See, e.g., MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26. 
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that “[b]y the end of 2011, the overall IIA 
universe consisted of 3,164 agreements, which included 2,833 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and 331 ‘other IIAs.’ ”102 Since the end of the Cold War, growth in BITs thus proceeded 
in excess of ten times the speed of growth reached prior to the end of the Cold War.103  
1. Broad Protection without Privity 
The common theme to all BITs and other similar IIAs is the scope of the protection they 
entail. The 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT “contain[ed] many of the substantive provisions that 
have become common in subsequent BITs,” including defining the term investment broadly, 
“[t]he contracting states undertake a general obligation to encourage foreign investment,” 
“[t]he parties are obliged to refrain from discrimination,” “[i]nvestments are to enjoy 
protection and security,” “[p]rovision is made for compensation due in the event of an 
expropriation,” and transfer guaranties are included in the treaty.104 Other treaties would 
add the fair and equitable treatment protection.105 These protections were premised on the 
Abs-Shawcross Convention and the OECD Draft Convention that were unsuccessful in 
obtaining sufficient support to become viable multilateral treaties.106 
The protections agreed upon in the first wave of bilateral investment treaties exceeded 
customary international law; for example, the treaty conferred new rights and obligations on 
the respective parties rather than stating the existing scope of rights and obligations.107 At 
the time that the original bilateral investment treaties were drafted, there was significant 
resistance in the capital-importing world to the expropriation protections laid out in the 
bilateral investment treaties.108 This resistance was at its strongest in the context of natural 
                                            
102.  UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT 
POLICIES 84 (2012), available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf. 
103.  Growth in BITs, while important to date only reached approximately pre-1990 BIT levels. Id. 
104.  ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS 
OF TREATMENT 42 (2009). 
105.  See, e.g., F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1980 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 241 (discussing early UK practice of including fair and equitable treatment provisions 
in bilateral investment treaties); Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
in International Investment Law and Practice, 1999 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 113–14 (“Indeed, while 
some of the earlier bilateral investment treaties did not expressly incorporate the standard, by the 
1970s fair and equitable treatment had assumed a position of prominence in most bilateral 
investment treaties.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Vandevelde, supra note 19, 44–45 (positing that the fair 
and equitable treatment standard was prevalent from the very start of BIT practice in the 1960s). 
106.  See, e.g., MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26. 
107.  See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 47, 58 (2009) (discussing the influence of BITs on the creation of new customary 
international law); Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the (Purported) Obligation under 
Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 159 (2011) (arguing that there is no empirical support that BIT standards 
regarding regulatory expropriation are part of customary international law). But see Timothy 
Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 998 (2012) (arguing that BITs codified existing 
customary international law); Yannick Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 1107 (2012); see also Schill, supra note 6 (discussing the various approaches to 
investment law taken in its brief history). 
108.  See Katia Fach Gómez, Latin America and ICSID: David Versus Goliath?, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 
195 (2011) (outlining the historical Calvo doctrine and its prevalence in Latin America in the 1960s); 
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resources,109 and even greater in the context of treatment protections that would incorporate 
breaches of undertakings into the scope of international legal liability.110 The resistance was 
premised on the understanding of national sovereignty—particularly its right to structure 
economic activity within its territorial scope.111 The treaties in question thus may have 
shaped the development of public international law—but did not initially reflect it. 
For public international law, BITs were truly innovative instruments. First, all the 
protections bestowed by the treaty reached beyond traditional privity requirements. The 
protections were not granted to a specific investor who had entered into an investment 
agreement with the host state. Instead, protections extended to all qualifying investments.112 
This shift was facially connected to the original claims mechanism in bilateral investment 
treaties: the home state would claim against the host state as was typical in the context of 
diplomatic protection.113 But the coverage of investments significantly expanded the scope of 
protection beyond diplomatic protection because it precisely dispensed with effective 
nationality and corporate standing rules underlying the law of diplomatic protection.114 By 
switching focus from the investor to the investment, BITs indelibly changed the nature of 
international economic law by broadening the scope of its potential applicability.115 It is this 
quantum leap that distinguishes international investment agreements of the “modern era” 
                                                                                                                  
Porterfield, supra note 107 (surveying state practice regarding obligations to pay compensation for 
regulatory expropriations). 
109.  See Lowenfeld, supra note 107 (discussing the U.N. General Assembly resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources); Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of South-South 
BITs for the International Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
101, 104–05 (2010) (“As a group, developing countries pursued these ideas in the General Assembly 
of the United Nations (UN) proposing a New International Economic Order (‘NIEO’), which allowed 
them ‘Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.’ A cornerstone result of these efforts was the 
1974 ‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,’ which stipulated that foreign investment 
disputes—over expropriation or otherwise—should be settled in the courts of host states and 
according to domestic law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Cantegreil, supra note 75, at 449 (linking 
expropriation decisions by the Libyan government expressly to claims of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources). 
110.  See supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
111.  See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
112.  See, e.g., MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26 (discussing the development of treaties of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, and bilateral investment agreements); Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 621, 625–27 
(1993) (discussing the evolution of the U.S. BIT program). 
113.  See Abs-Shawcross Convention, supra note 24, art. VII(1). 
114.  See, e.g., MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 133–38 (noting that with the advent of bilateral 
investment treaties, “nationality no longer serves the function of defining when a home State may 
espouse a claim, though the threshold jurisdictional question of nationality—like the threshold 
question of ‘investment’—looms large as the basis for potential objections to jurisdiction on the part 
of respondent States”); see also Robert D. Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary 
International Legal Regulation of Nationality, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2009) (submitting that 
nationality in investor-state proceedings should be measured only by reference to an abuse of right 
standard). 
115.  See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 114, at 54 (“Within the limits established by the ICSID Convention's 
explicit text and the need to avert abuses, states should therefore be free to define nationality—
without reference to the genuine link theory—more or less broadly in investment instruments 
authorizing resort to ICSID arbitration so as to afford them the maximum flexibility to further their 
particular economic, developmental, or other sociopolitical needs, as well as the values of their 
polities.”). 
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from prior regimes of investment protection, for example through treaties of friendship, 
commerce and navigation.116 
Second, BITs ultimately altered the substance of “sovereignty.”117 BITs effectively 
narrowed the range of sovereign discretion in its domestic markets by requiring the host state 
to pay compensation for unreasonable regulatory impairment of investments.118 International 
law thus came to impose a reasonableness requirement on market regulations.119 This 
reasonableness requirement most powerfully injects a free market ethos into the 
international legal order by limiting the role of the state within it.  
2. Enforcement through Private Right of Action 
From 1968 onwards, BITs were responsible for yet another quantum leap: The protections 
included in BITs became directly actionable by investors owning or controlling covered 
investments.120 It was the direct enforcement of BIT rights that more than anything else 
shaped the current state of international investment law.121 Direct enforcement transcended 
vague expressions of state intent to protect investors and transformed investment protection 
into one of a few areas of full enforcement of public international legal obligations.122 
Clauses giving investors the right to proceed against the state directly are transformative: 
they provide investors direct legal rights against the state. This type of agreement is precisely 
                                            
116.  MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26; Vandevelde, supra note 112, at 625–27. 
117.  See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 658 (1998) (“BITs offer foreign investors greater 
protection that [sic] the Hull Rule ever did.”); Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A 
Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1091 (2008) (concluding that “the 
increasing web of binding treaties, especially in the commercial context—e.g., the vast number of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—has resulted in a de facto surrender of sovereignty to these 
legal institutions.”). 
118.  See, e.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, supra note 107, at 168 (“This formulation of fair and equitable 
treatment functions as a particularly broad version of regulatory takings doctrine: the investor's 
‘legitimate expectations’ define the economic interests that are entitled to protection from 
‘frustration’ or impairment by regulatory or tax measures.”). 
119.  See, e.g., Dolzer, supra note 19, at 103 (“A second dimension covered by the requirements of fair and 
equitable treatment also concerns the investor's ability of planning and doing business, in regard to 
the conduct of the host state subsequent to the investment. Consistency in the course of actions of 
the host state concerns the investor in all areas of regulations, from the process of requiring and 
granting of permits to regulations of health and environment and the imposition of taxes, royalties 
and duties.”); Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment 
Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 105 (2007) (“[F]air 
and equitable treatment includes the requirement of stability and predictability of the legal 
framework and consistency in the host State's decision-making, the principle of legality, the 
protection of investor confidence or legitimate expectations, procedural due process and denial of 
justice, protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, the requirement of transparency and 
the concept of reasonableness and proportionality.”). 
120.  NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 104, at 58. 
121.  See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26; Sloane, supra note 114, at 50–54; Vandevelde, supra 
note 112, at 625–27. 
122.  See, e.g., George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforcing 
Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some 
Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 704 (2008) (“ICSID awards hold 
considerable attractiveness. Historically, most such awards have been voluntarily satisfied, thus 
making enforcement unnecessary.”); cf. Edward Baldwin et al., The Arbitration Risk Facing 
Sovereign Investors, 23 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 22 (2004) (outlining the means to resist enforcement of 
ICSID awards). 
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of the kind identified by Hans Kelsen as bestowing international legal rights on investors.123 
Taking Kelsen’s observation that direct enforcement equals bestowal of a substantive right 
seriously, the inclusion of a direct right of action takes investment obligations incurred under 
BITs beyond the reach of even the contracting states to BITs once the rights in the BIT are 
fully vested.124 If the host state acts in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the investor 
under the BIT, the host state violates the treaty.125 A treaty violation is directly actionable 
under the BIT’s dispute resolution clause.126 
The introduction of the dispute resolution provision creates legal stability in international 
economic law,127 and is consistent with the overall goal of the 1990s to protect the commercial 
market place.128 This stability is required for the protections enumerated in the BITs to 
function as a risk mitigation tool and thus to have commercial value. The dispute resolution 
provision therefore is the centerpiece of the current investment law paradigm.  
C. The BIT Paradigm in Action 
In the last decade, BIT claims have exploded. More than 40 percent of all BIT claims 
prosecuted have been filed within the last five years.129 This explosion of BIT claims has 
placed an appreciable strain on investment arbitration because of the lack of time for 
reflection it permitted participants. This strain has caused an academic and political backlash 
against investor-state arbitration.130 This backlash endangers the availability of investor-
state arbitration at a time when it is needed the most. 
1. Overview of BIT Claims 
A significant number of investment treaty claims were borne from economic crisis. The 
single most significant group of claims concerns the Argentine financial crisis.131 These claims 
assert that Argentina’s reaction to the 2001–02 financial crisis deprived investors of their 
                                            
123.  HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (1952). 
124.  Id. at 143–44. 
125.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
126.  See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 26; Sloane, supra note 114, at 50–54; Vandevelde, supra 
note 112, at 625–27. 
127.  See, e.g., Susan D. Frank, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of 
Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 373 (2006) (concluding that “[i]nvestment 
treaty arbitration in particular has a unique role to play in the future of foreign investment. 
Governments are likely to continue to focus upon the capacity of dispute resolution mechanisms to 
affect investor confidence, minimize investment risk, and create incentives for investing abroad.”). 
128.  Id. at 338. 
129.  See The ICSID Caseload—Statistics, supra note 11, at 7 (222 claims filed with ICSID between 1972 
and 2006 and 168 since 2007).  
130.  See, e.g., Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and 
Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY xxxvii 
(Michael Waibel et al., eds., 2010) (“Commentators increasingly see signs of . . . a backlash against 
the foreign investment regime.”); Alvarez, supra note 8; see also GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT 
TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007). 
131.  Over the past few decades, fifty-one investor-state dispute claims have been filed against Argentina. 
U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA ISSUES 
NOTE, March 2011, at 2, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20113_en.pdf. The ICSID 
portion of these claims corresponds to more than 10% of the total case volume of ICSID as an 
institution. The ICSID Caseload—Statistics, supra note 11, at 7. 
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fundamental expectations when making investments in Argentina.132 Most immediately, the 
loss of payment of concessions in U.S. dollar equivalent currency undermined the economics 
justifying foreign investors to invest in Argentina in the first place.133  
In the Argentine arbitrations, a key issue was whether extreme economic conditions, or 
extremis, suspends operation of bilateral treaty obligations either as a matter of customary 
international law or by virtue of non-precluded measures clauses negotiated as part of the 
treaties themselves.134 Arbitral tribunals generally have recognized that economic extremis 
can preclude the international wrongfulness of significant regulatory impairment of foreign 
investments in the right circumstances.135 Arbitral tribunals further have concluded that the 
same extremis in the right circumstances could trigger non-precluded measures clauses 
included in bilateral investment treaties.136 Tribunals remained divided on whether the 
actions taken by Argentina in response to the financial crisis met the requirements of either 
customary international law or the non-precluded measures clause in the treaty and whether 
these actions could serve as a defense to wrongfulness, particularly because tribunals found 
that Argentina’s economic policies were in part to blame for bringing about the economic 
crisis in the first place.137 
By far not all claims concern economic extremis. In many instances, political change in the 
host country has brought about a change in attitude towards foreign investment in general, 
or private investment in a particular economic field. Venezuela’s nationalization of strategic 
(and non-strategic) industries is one of the clearest examples of such a policy change.138 Less 
clear examples include the change of heart by the German government with regard to its 
nuclear power sector and changes in policy relating to subsidies for green energy proposals.139  
Claims under BITs and other IIAs have significant breadth. They have led to claims 
against traditional capital importing countries like Zimbabwe.140 But they have also led to a 
host of claims against capital exporting countries such as the United States, Canada, and 
                                            
132.  José E Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentina Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the 
Heart of the Investment Regime, 2008/2009 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 379, 389 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 
2009).  
133.  Id. at 390–404 (outlining the claims presented against Argentina and Argentina’s affirmative 
defenses).  
134.  Id.  
135.  See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Liability, ¶¶ 248–59 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 (2006). 
136.  See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 374 
(Sept. 28, 2007), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC694_En&caseId=C8. For a full discussion of the invocation of non-precluded measures clauses, 
see Michael D. Nolan & Frédéric G. Sourgens, The Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging Emergency 
Clauses in International Investment Agreements, 2010/2011 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 362 (Karl P. 
Sauvant ed., 2011). 
137.  Id. 
138.  See, e.g., García, supra note 62 (discussing Venezuela’s radical policy changes in the oil and gas 
sector). 
139.  See, e.g., Juergen Baetz, Germans Face Hefty Bill to End Nuclear Power, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 15, 
2012), http://news.yahoo.com/germans-face-hefty-bill-end-nuclear-power-135331816--finance.html. 
140.  Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award (Apr. 22, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf. 
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Germany.141 These agreements have even prompted claims by nationals from states, such as 
Venezuela, against their former colonial powers.142 Stakes are high and growing with claims 
in the tens of billions of dollars becoming the new norm.143 In some instances, the very threat 
of action has arguably influenced domestic policy decisions in countries as far apart as the 
United States and Mongolia.144 The effectiveness of the private enforcement in bringing an 
international economic law agenda to the forefront is nearly unparalleled in international 
law—and has brought more than a fair share of critics to the scene. 
2. The State Strikes Back 
The growth of international investment law as a discipline has led to a host of criticisms of 
the investment protection paradigm. The complaints raised against the current paradigm 
have ranged from accusations of bias by private tribunals in favor of investors to traditional 
concerns about state sovereignty.145 These complaints have grown particularly in academic 
circles, with entire edited volumes being dedicated to the backlash against the investor-state 
paradigm.146 Although no coherent theme of criticism of the investor-state paradigm has yet 
emerged, the very existence of the web of bilateral investment treaties and its private 
enforcement mechanism has become a political, and perhaps even ideological, powder keg. 
Calls for its abolition are growing louder—leaving investors with uncertainty as to whether 
                                            
141.  See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf; Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, 
Award (Mar. 31, 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf; Vattenfall 
AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/VattenfallAward.pdf. 
142.  Inversión y Gestión de Bienes, IGB, S.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/17, Pending 
(Reg. July 9, 2012). 
143.  See Goldhaber, supra note 12 (“ALM's 2011 Arbitration Scorecard shines a light on 113 billion-dollar 
cases: 65 based on old-fashioned contracts and 48 based at least in part on investment treaties or 
legislation.”). 
144.  See, e.g., Paushok v. Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 181 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 
Apr. 28, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf (“In August 2009, Mongolia 
repealed the WPT, with the repeal being effective in 2011.”); Robert Feinberg, EU Crisis: Searching 
for the Bernanke Put, MONEYNEWS (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/Bernanke-
put-EU-CATO/2012/10/08/id/459106 (“At a CATO event in June, Efraim Benmelech, a Harvard 
economics professor, presented data showing that a surprising share of TALF funding went to 
foreign banks, predominantly in the European Union.”); Inst. of Int’l Bankers, Institute Urges the 
Federal Reserve to Include Foreign Government-Controlled Banks in the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility, 30 INT’L BANKING FOCUS 2 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.iib.org/associations/6316/files/20090227Focus.pdf (“The Institute has asked the Federal 
Reserve to reconsider the exclusion of foreign government-controlled banks from the TALF on the 
grounds that their inclusion would promote the purposes of the program and be consistent with both 
statutory requirements and the principle of national treatment and related U.S. treaty 
obligations.”). 
145.  See, e.g., GUS VAN HARTEN, supra note 130; THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, supra note 130; William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, 
Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 
YALE J. INT’L L. 283 (2010). 
146.  See, e.g., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, supra note 
130. 
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the commitments upon which they relied will remain effective for the duration of their 
investments.147 
The vehemence of the “Return of the State” has left a mark on investment law.148 Drafts of 
new international investment agreements are both far more specific in the protections they 
extend to foreign investment and far more permissive of regulatory action in the market place 
with regard to the protections the treaties continue to extend.149 Paradoxically, these changes 
are more prevalent in the BITs of traditional capital exporting countries like the United 
States and Norway than they are in those concluded between capital importing states.150 
These prospective changes to new bilateral investment agreements, of course, have only a 
very limited impact on existing treaty obligations. 
The “Return of the State” has also led to a noticeable change in attitudes of arbitrators. As 
one treatise notes, the jurisdictional review conducted by arbitral tribunals today is markedly 
more searching than it was even a decade ago.151 The “second generation” of decisions 
addressing the Argentine financial crisis was far more ready to find that extremis suffered in 
Argentina suspended applicability of BITs than the first generation was.152 Further, tribunals 
today are far more likely to inquire into proof of asserted customary international law 
protections by investors than they would have been as little as five years ago.153 The 
                                            
147.  See, e.g., Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, 
ALAINET.ORG (Sept. 2, 2010), http://alainet.org/active/40578. 
148.  Alvarez, supra note 8. 
149.  See, e.g., Kenneth Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs, 2008/2009 Y.B. 
INT’L INV. L. & POL. 283, 314 (“Ultimately, the 2004 model is an instrument of retrenchment. The 
single greatest innovation in the BITs had been the creation of the investor-state disputes provision 
and, in the 2004 model, the United States reclaimed some of the power handed to the tribunals in 
the 1994 and earlier models. Thus, the 2004 model clarifies certain substantive provisions for the 
benefit of tribunals, takes certain issues from the tribunals entirely, clarifies the limits of the 
remedies tribunals may provide, adds mechanisms to divert some claims to other means of dispute 
resolution, injects greater transparency into the process, and seeks to improve the efficiency of 
investor-state arbitration. Substantive obligations that were the core of prior models either have 
been clarified in an effort to avoid an expansive application or have been hedged with larger 
numbers of exceptions. In the few instances where new substantive obligations have been imposed, 
these generally are outside the scope of the investor-state disputes provision, thereby avoiding any 
expansion of the power of the tribunals.”).  
150.  See id.; see also Charles H. Brower II, Corporations as Plaintiffs under International Law: Three 
Narratives about Investment Treaties, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 179, 194–97 (2011) (comparing the 
2007 Model Norwegian BIT to the 2004 Model U.S. BIT). 
151.  MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 18–23. 
152.  See Continental Casualty Co. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 
2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf; LG&E Energy Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 
203 (2006); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the 
Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the Award (June 10, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1550_En&caseId=C8; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (July 30, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf. For a discussion of decisions, see Leah 
D. Harhay, The Argentine Annulments: The Uneasy Application of ICSID Article 52 in Parallel 
Claims, 2011/2012 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL. (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012). 
153.  See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 22 (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf. For a discussion of Glamis, see José E. 
Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 27–28 
(2011). 
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discipline thus has undergone a significant shift in its last several years of growth even 
outside of the treaty-drafting world.  
Beyond these internal modifications that seek to adjust the scope of international 
investment protection within the current system, some states have begun the process of 
leaving the system as a whole. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador recently withdrew from the 
ICSID Convention.154 All three either have or are contemplating withdrawing from existing 
BITs.155 All three withdrew from the ICSID Convention in part with an eye to frustrating 
potential claims by existing investors at the time of the withdrawals.156 As discussed in the 
remainder of the Article, this attempt to undermine the existing system of investment 
protection will not be efficacious. 
As appreciable as the backlash against investor-state arbitration is, it is in large part a 
mirage: a distraction from the underlying policy goals of those states decrying that the 
investor-state arbitral system has essentially failed. States like Venezuela continue to 
conclude BITs that call for investor-state arbitration—just with different partners (such as 
Cuba and Iran).157 Similarly, the Russian Federation continues to expand its own BIT 
arsenal despite withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty during the pendency of 
arbitrations concerning the expropriation of the Yukos Oil Company.158 The continued use by 
states like Venezuela and the Russian Federation of BITs is important context for statements 
that these instruments constitute unacceptable encroachments on state sovereignty. The 
actions of these states instead reveal a simple change in geopolitical alignment underneath 
the current bluster rather than honest disagreement with the bilateral investment treaty 
paradigm.  
Given the unsurprising geopolitical undertones of the current backlash against the 
investment protection paradigm, the ease with which states can deny prior commitments is 
critical to the efficacy of the system as a whole. A system that permits exit at will and without 
                                            
154.  Bolivia Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID News Release (May 16, 
2007), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&Pag
eType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3 
[hereinafter Bolivia Notice]; Ecuador Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, 
ICSID News Release (July 9, 2009), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&Pag
eType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20 
[hereinafter Ecuador Notice]; Venezuela Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, 
ICSID News Release (Jan. 26, 2012), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&Pag
eType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement100 
[hereinafter Venezuela Notice]. 
155.  See, e.g., Gómez, supra note 108, at 217. 
156.  See id. 
157.  U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Total Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded: Venezuela 
(June 1, 2012), available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_venezuela.pdf. 
158.  Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, ¶ 34 (Nov. 30, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/YULvRussianFederation-
InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf; U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Total Number of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Concluded: Russian Federation (June 1, 2012), available at 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_russia.pdf. 
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cost makes compliance with international legal obligations of the state purely voluntary.159 
Such a system does not in fact bestow legal protections on participants on which they can rely 
prospectively. Instead, it serves as a purely allocative mechanism to distribute a fixed pool of 
assets set aside by the state to qualified investors retrospectively; for example, for harm that 
has already occurred and for which claims have already been presented.160 The nature of the 
entire system of investment protection thus depends upon the following question: What is the 
consequence of an exit from the system? 
II. Current Theories of Withdrawal from International 
 Investment Agreements Are Inadequate 
As withdrawals from international investment agreements are increasing, scholarship on 
the consequence of withdrawal from IIAs no longer addresses an interesting thought 
experiment. It now addresses a live issue, with real consequences for investors and host 
states. This changed reality throws into relief how and why this area of law remains 
fundamentally under-developed. 
This Section discusses the main theoretical approaches to withdrawal from international 
investment agreements by (a) setting out the current practice of withdrawal from 
international investment agreements that theories of withdrawal must address; (b) critiquing 
the currently prevalent “offer-and-acceptance” model of investor-state consent and its 
consequences for withdrawal from international investment agreements; and (c) addressing 
the “firm offer” model developed when withdrawal from international investment agreements 
was first exercised. 
A. Current Practice of Termination of Investment Agreements  
States withdraw from obligations owed to international investors under IIAs in two 
principal ways. First, states can withdraw from IIAs or terminate investment laws providing 
substantive protections to international investors. Second, states can withdraw from the 
ICSID Convention, thus attempting to deprive investor-state arbitrations under IIAs of their 
efficacy. These two manners of withdrawal from international investment obligations 
represent attempts to deprive the investor completely of its treaty rights. They are discussed 
first. 
1. Denunciation of International Investment Agreements and 
Investment Laws 
Venezuela’s abandonment of international investment agreements is a significant example 
of the practice of withdrawal. On April 30, 2008, six months prior to the expiry of the initial 
                                            
159.  Cf. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 419 (2011) 
(“As a legal theory the doctrine of self-limitation cannot be interpreted otherwise than as a denial of 
the binding force of international law.”). 
160.  Alternatively, it may consist of setting aside or budgeting exposure at the front end and thus again 
representing an allocative rather than rights-redemptive function. Cf. Reisman, supra note 30, at 
41. 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2013) 
362 
term of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela (Netherlands-Venezuela 
BIT), Venezuela notified the Netherlands of its intention to terminate the agreement.161 The 
Netherland-Venezuela BIT states that the treaty had an initial term of fifteen years.162 The 
term was to be extended by an additional ten years “[u]nless notice of termination has been 
given by either Contracting Party at least six months before the date of the expiry of its 
validity.”163 The treaty finally provides that “[i]n respect of investments made before the date 
of the termination of the present Agreement the foregoing Articles thereof shall continue to be 
effective for a further period of fifteen years from that date.”164 
Significant investments to Venezuela were routed through Dutch entities.165 A substantial 
number of claims were already pending under the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT at the time of 
issuance of the termination notice.166 For these cases, Venezuela does not appear to have 
submitted that termination of the treaty had any impact on pending proceedings.167 But 
several claims against Venezuela have been filed after termination took effect but before 
expiry of the fifteen year sunset period.168 These cases will have to decide upon the effect of 
termination of the BIT on the right of investors to pursue direct claims against Venezuela. 
Like Venezuela, Ecuador is currently in the process of withdrawing from a significant 
number of BITs. Ecuador’s president requested permission to withdraw from thirteen of the 
country’s BITs.169 The treaties in question included those concluded between Ecuador and the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Canada, 
Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and China.170 The Ecuadorian national assembly recently took 
                                            
161.  Luke Eric Peterson, Venezuela Surprises the Netherlands with Termination Notice for BIT, Treaty 
Has Been Used by Many Investors to “Route” Investments into Venezuela, INV. ARB. REP. (May 16, 
2008), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20091001_93; cf. Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Venezuela, Neth.-Venez., Oct. 22, 1991, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_venezuela.pdf [hereinafter Neth-
Venez. BIT]. 
162.  Neth-Venez. BIT, supra note 161, art. 14(1). 
163.  Id. at 14(2). 
164.  Id. at 14(3) (the “sun-set period”). 
165.  Peterson, supra note 161. 
166.  Id. 
167.  The denunciation is not mentioned in two jurisdictional decisions issued in these proceedings. See 
Mobil Corp. Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1510_En&caseId=C256; CEMEX Caracas Inv. B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 30, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1831_En&caseId=C420. 
168.  See, e.g., Venoklim Holding B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/22 
(Reg. Aug. 15, 2012); OI European Group B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/25 (Reg. Sept. 26, 2011). See also Who’s Suing Venezuela? A Round-Up of Recent Claims, 
DUTCH CARIBBEAN LEGAL PORTAL (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/news/latest-news/2366-who-s-suing-venezuela-a-round-
up-of-recent-claims. 
169.  Gómez, supra note 108, at 217. 
170.  Michael D. Nolan, Frédéric G. Sourgens, & Erin Culbertson, Milbank Client Alert: The Erosion Bit 
by BIT of Investment Protection in Ecuador, MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP (Nov. 3, 
2009), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/5/7/573.pdf. 
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the first step to do so, declaring that the treaties violate the Ecuadorian constitution.171 
Bolivia similarly has withdrawn from bilateral investment agreements such as the U.S.-
Bolivia BIT.172 Denunciation of these treaties similarly could lead to arbitration of the issue 
in the future.  
There is also relevant state practice concerning the withdrawal from investment laws 
containing both substantive protections and a consent to ICSID arbitration. Because there is 
relatively little guidance on the withdrawal from international investment treaties, this 
practice is instructive because of its analogous effect on investor rights. Thus, in the ICSID 
arbitration between Rumeli and Kazakhstan, the investor invoked a Kazakh investment law 
as an additional basis for its claim.173 The Kazakh investment law had been in force when the 
investment had been made, but the consent to ICSID arbitration had been removed prior to 
commencement of Rumeli’s claim.174  
The Rumeli tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction under the Kazakh investment 
law.175 It expressly recognized that “[t]he fact that the Foreign Investment Law was repealed 
as of January 8, 2003, does not have an impact on ICSID jurisdiction” because the Investment 
Law “was indeed valid and effective at all times relevant to this dispute” and “Article 6(1) 
grants foreign investors protection against adverse changes in legislation for a period of ten 
years from the date they made their investment, or for the entire duration of the contract 
exceeding ten years entered into with authorized State bodies.”176 It determined that “[t]his 
[was] the case here.”177 
2. Denunciation of the ICSID Convention 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, as of the date of the writing of this Article, were the only 
states to withdraw from the ICSID Convention. ICSID received Bolivia’s notice of withdrawal 
on May 2, 2007,178 Ecuador’s on July 6, 2009,179 and Venezuela’s on January 24, 2012.180 In 
all of these cases, ICSID did not post receipt of the notice on its website and did not otherwise 
immediately notify the general public that it received the withdrawal notice for several 
days.181 
                                            
171.  See id.; cf. Gómez, supra note 108, at 217.  
172.  See Notice of Termination of United States-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,584 
(May 23, 2012). 
173.  Republic of Kazakhstan v. Rumeli Telekom A.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶¶ 221, 308 
(July 29, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/Telsimaward.pdf. 
174.  Id. (“According to Respondent, Claimants' purported reliance on the FIL as founding jurisdiction for 
this Arbitral Tribunal is also misplaced. Indeed, the consent to arbitrate disputes relating to foreign 
investment under the FIL was no longer effective at the time of the commencement of these 
proceedings, as the FIL had been repealed. Claimants’ contention that the consent to ICSID 
arbitration survives this repeal by reason of Article 6 (1) FIL is misconceived;” as briefed by 
claimants, “Article 6(1) of the Law specifically grants foreign investors protection against adverse 
changes in legislation for a period of ten years from the date they made their investment, or for the 
entire duration of a contract exceeding ten years entered into with authorized State bodies.”) 
175.  Id. ¶ 333. 
176.  Id. 
177. Id. 
178.  Bolivia Notice, supra note 154. 
179.  See id.; Ecuador Notice, supra note 154. 
180.  Venezuela Notice, supra note 154.  
181.  Ecuador Notice, supra note 154; Venezuela Notice, supra note 154.  
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 The ICSID Convention provides in relevant part in Article 71 as follows: “Any 
Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the depositary of this 
Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of such notice.”182 The 
ICSID Convention further states in Article 72 that: 
 Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not affect the rights 
or obligations under this Convention of that State or of any of its constituent 
subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State arising out of consent to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such notice was received by the 
depositary.183 
These provisions to date have not been interpreted by international investment tribunals. As 
a result, the interplay between consent provided in international investment agreements and 
the denunciation of the ICSID Convention is likely to give rise to hotly contested disputes.  
Most of the currently pending disputes may well give a misleading answer: in most 
relevant currently pending disputes, the investor’s consent to ICSID arbitration was 
communicated to the host state in the six month period prior to the denunciation having 
taken effect.184 This posture means that the efficacy of treaty consent to ICSID arbitration 
after denunciation has taken effect will not be directly tested.  
The case most likely to give an answer to that question—and so far the only case that will 
have to provide such an answer—is Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of 
Bolivia.185 As reported in the press, Pan American Energy’s consent to ICSID arbitration in 
that dispute post-dated Bolivia’s 2007 denunciation of the ICSID Convention by several 
years, and in fact concerned an expropriation taking place in 2009.186 Pan American Energy 
relies on the BIT consent in the U.S.-Bolivia BIT,187 which permits investors a choice of 
forum, including ICSID arbitration.188 
B. Current Practice Reveals the Failure of the “Offer-And-
Acceptance” Model of Investment Protection 
The most commonly held view of consent to investor-state arbitration under BITs is that 
the host state makes an offer of arbitration that the investor in turn accepts, entitled the 
                                            
182.  ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 71. 
183.  ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 72. 
184.  The author understands that all cases registered against Venezuela at the end of August 2012 in 
fact have an investor consent date preceding the expiration of the six month withdrawal period that 
began to run on January 24, 2012 given the time taken by the ordinary ICSID registration process. 
The latest registration date is August 27, 2012. The same is true of most arbitrations commenced 
against Bolivia.  
185.  See Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/8 (Reg. 
Apr. 12, 2010). 
186.  Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Pan American Energy Takes Bolivia to ICSID over Nationalization of 
Chaco Petroleum, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (May 11, 2010), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2010/05/11/pan-american-energy-takes-bolivia-to-icsid-over-nationalization-
of-chaco-petroleum/. 
187.  Id.; cf. Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Bol., Apr. 17, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-26 (2000), available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_bolivia.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Bolivia BIT]. 
188.  U.S.-Bolivia BIT, supra note 187, art. IX(3). 
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“offer-and-acceptance” model.189 As discussed in this Section, the model of consent to 
arbitration similarly applies to the substantive protections included in the bilateral 
investment treaty. For example, the investor must accept the protections or risk losing them 
through subsequent state action. Furthermore, the offer-and-acceptance model of investment 
protection is ultimately internally inconsistent as well as unworkable. The flaws in the offer-
and-acceptance model are revealed by many of the fact patterns already at issue in currently 
pending cases involving the denunciation of investment treaties.  
1. The “Offer-and-Acceptance Model” of Investment Protection 
The most commonly held view of investment protection is borrowed from contract law: the 
state makes an offer in a bilateral investment treaty or in legislation and the investor accepts 
that offer.190 The manner in which the investor accepts the offer of protection is through 
consenting to investor-state arbitration. 
The offer-and-acceptance approach was best developed by Professor Christoph Schreuer. 
In the leading commentary on the ICSID Convention, Professor Schreuer explains that 
investor-state arbitration functions along the same lines as contractual arbitration and 
requires a written agreement to arbitrate.191 This written agreement to arbitrate does not 
need to be contained in a single instrument but can be embodied in an exchange of writings 
between the host state and the investor: there is an offer of arbitration by the host state in 
the form of the bilateral investment treaty or legislation.192 This offer must be accepted by the 
investor to become binding.193  
This approach follows the commercial arbitration paradigm. In the context of the New 
York Convention, the Contracting States obligate themselves to recognize agreements in 
writing in which parties undertake to submit a dispute to arbitration.194 The New York 
Convention further explains that the “term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include an arbitral 
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an 
exchange of letters or telegrams.”195 The question in the context of commercial arbitration 
then is whether there is a separate contract in existence between the parties agreeing to the 
arbitration of their commercial disputes founded in an offer-and-acceptance of arbitration 
(rather than a broader agreement on the entire contract). In both instances, offers to arbitrate 
are thus analogous to offers in common contract law: they have to be “accepted” by the offeree 
to bind the offeror.196 Acceptance “perfects” consent to ICSID arbitration.197 
                                            
189.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
190.  See SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 192, 206; cf. SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 190–92. 
191.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 1285–86; cf. SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 1280–82. 
192.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 192; SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 190–92. 
193.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 206 (“While a host state may express its consent to ICSID’s 
jurisdiction through legislation, the investor must perform some reciprocal act to perfect consent. 
Even where consent is based on the host State’s legislation, it can only come into existence through 
an agreement between the parties.”); SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 211. 
194.  United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
art. II(1), done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517. 
195.  Id. art. II(2). 
196.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 206; SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 211. 
197.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 1285; SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 1280–82. 
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Consistently, with the offer-and-acceptance paradigm, an offer to arbitrate with an 
investor, even one included in a treaty, can be revoked. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention 
refers to “consent in writing” as being irrevocable. An “offer” to consent is not a consent.198 
Not accepting the offer in a timely fashion, and particularly waiting to consent until 
institution of arbitral proceedings, “runs the risk that the offer may be withdrawn at any time 
before then.”199 
As a matter of trite contract law, an offer can be revoked without informing the offeree 
directly. The United States Restatement (Second) of Contract Law thus states that “[a]n 
offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent 
with an intention to enter into the proposed contract and the offeree acquires reliable 
information to that effect.”200 Further, “the offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated when a 
notice of termination is given publicity by advertisement or other general notification equal to 
that given to the offer and no better means of notification is reasonably available.”201 
Consistent with the contract law paradigm, denunciation of the ICSID Convention is 
revocation of the offer. A revocation has immediate effect. In other words, once made and 
received, the offer can no longer be accepted.202 The revocation is effective immediately even 
with regard to offers that on their face appear to allow acceptance to be made in a longer 
period of time.203 Similarly, the denunciation of a BIT should have immediate effect on the 
investor-state arbitration provisions. Those provisions are the offers in question. 
Denunciation of the BIT is the actual revocation of the offer and has the immediate effect of 
depriving the investor of a direct remedy against the state. 
2. The Offer-and-Acceptance Model Draws an Inapposite Contract Law 
Analogy 
The offer-and-acceptance model is incoherent. Its focus on the relationship between host 
state and investor blocks out the existing relationship between the host state and the home 
state. It transforms a three dimensional relationship into a two dimensional playing field. 
Assuming that the appropriate reference point is in fact the law of contracts and commercial 
arbitration, the consequences of the third dimension—the treaty relationship between home 
state and host state—must be taken into account. 
Within contract law, situations where a non-party to a contract receives rights under a 
contract fall under the subject of the law of third-party beneficiaries, not the law of offer-and-
acceptance.204 The law of third-party beneficiaries recognizes that a person acquires a right as 
an intended beneficiary “if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is 
                                            
198.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1981) (requiring mutual assent for formation of a 
contract). 
199.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 253. 
200.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43 (1981). 
201.  Id. § 46. 
202.  Id. §§ 42, 46. Because the offer is a general one—e.g., “by advertisement in a newspaper or other 
general notification to the public”—the making of a denunciation in the same manner as the original 
notification terminates the power of acceptance. Id. § 46. 
203.  Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 157–61 (4th 
ed. 2004). 
204.  For the difference between both regimes, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 203, at 694–99 (discussing 
how third-party beneficiary rights vest). 
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appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties” and “the circumstances indicate that 
the promise intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”205  
Promises to arbitrate disputes can be enforced by third-party beneficiaries of a contract 
against one of the contracting parties.206 This is recognized not only in U.S. law, but also in 
mature civil law jurisdictions.207 The right of third-party beneficiaries to enforce arbitration 
provisions was further recognized by international law tribunals such as the Iran-U.S. Claims 
tribunal.208 The investor-state arbitration provision in a bilateral investment treaty itself 
therefore is a right bestowed upon the investor as a third-party beneficiary. 
                                            
205.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). On the historical development of the law of 
third-party beneficiaries, see, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1358 (1992); Anthony John Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the 
Third-Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). 
206.  See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase v. Conegie, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007) (enforcing arbitration 
clause in nursing home care agreement signed by mother of the resident against the resident); John 
Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48, 59–61 (2d Cir. 2001) (compelling arbitration when 
sought by a third-party beneficiary under the National Securities Dealers Code requiring NASD 
members to arbitrate claims upon demand of a customer); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2001); Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 
875 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (arbitration clause enforceable by and against third-party 
beneficiaries); Ripmaster v. Toyoda Gosei, Co., 824 F. Supp. 116, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that 
an employee was a third-party beneficiary bound by the arbitration clause of a consulting 
agreement between employer and foreign firm); Shahan v. Staley (In re Matter of Shahan 
Irrevocable & Inter Vivos Trust), 932 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (compelling arbitration 
when sought by a third-party beneficiary of a trust against a broker under the section 12(a) of the 
National Securities Dealers Code requiring NASD members to arbitrate claims upon demand of a 
customer); Nama Holdings v. Related World Market Ctr., 922 A.2d 417, 431 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(confirming that a third-party beneficiary is bound by an arbitration clause to the same extent as 
the signatories); Tortoriello v. Gerald Nissan of North Aurora, Inc., 882 N.E.2d 157, 180 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2008) (quoting Dannewitz v. Equicredit Corp. of Am., 775 N.E. 2d 189, 192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)); 
Dannewitz, 775 N.E.2d at 192 (“The third-party beneficiary doctrine applies to arbitration 
agreements.”); Carolyn L. Dessin, Arbitrability and Vulnerability, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
349, 358 (2012) (noting that third-party beneficiaries can compel arbitration); George Lee Flint, Jr., 
Securities Regulation, 63 SMU L. Rev. 795, 801 (2010) (discussing enforcement of FINRA 
arbitration provisions by third-party beneficiaries); Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 540–48 (2008) (advocating the use of arbitration clauses by third-party 
beneficiaries to enforce human rights obligations); Michael H. Bagot, Jr. & Dana A. Henderson, Not 
Party, Not Bound? Not Necessarily: Binding Third Parties to Maritime Arbitration, 26 TUL. MAR. 
L.J. 413 (2002) (discussing use of third-party beneficiary claims to enforce arbitration provisions in 
maritime law disputes); R. Doak Bishop et al., Strategic Options Available When Catastrophe 
Strikes the Major International Energy Project, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 635, 683 (2001) (discussing the use 
of third-party beneficiary arguments to compel arbitration in international energy project disputes); 
cf. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
there was insufficient evidence to enforce an arbitration clause against the Government of 
Turkmenistan on the theory that Turkmenistan was a third-party beneficiary under a joint venture 
agreement). 
207.  See Vera van Houtte et al., What’s New in European Arbitration?, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2011/Jan. 
2012, at 13, 14–15 (reviewing Swiss Federal Supreme Court case of April 19, 2011 enforcing 
arbitration clause at the request of third-party beneficiaries to a contract); James M. Hosking, The 
Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice 
without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469, 523–29 (2004) (discussing growing 
convergence between the United States, France, and England in their recognition that third-party 
beneficiaries may enforce arbitration provisions). 
208.  See Hosking, supra note 207, at 527 (discussing Land Serv. Inc. v. Iran and Ocean-Air Cargo Claims 
Inc. v. Iran). 
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Arbitration provisions in BITs further prove that an investor under a BIT meets the 
definition of an intended beneficiary.209 Thus, 
In order to qualify as an intended beneficiary, one must meet two requirements. First, 
one must show that ‘recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is 
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties.’ Second, one must show that 
either: 
‘(a) The performance of the promise will satisfy an obligations of the promisee to pay 
money to the beneficiary; or 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the 
benefit of the promised performance.’210 
The dispute resolution provision clarifies that the parties intended enforcement of the 
other protections provided in the treaty by qualifying investors, thus meeting the first prong 
of the intended beneficiary test under the Restatement: “recognition of a right to performance 
in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties.”211 The arbitration 
provision also evidences the home state’s intention to give the benefit of the promised 
performance, thus satisfying the second element: the final award will be due and payable in 
full to the investor, rather than to the home state.212 This modality of performance on the 
final award derogates from traditional public international law of diplomatic protection that 
paradigmatically viewed the injury at issue in public international law proceedings as one 
done to the home state and not the investor—thus paying the home state rather than the 
investor without any requirement that the home state hold the sums awarded in trust for the 
persons taken under protection.213 
The consequence of third-party beneficiary status is that investors have rights against the 
host state: “Once it is decided that a party is an intended beneficiary, it follows that the party 
has a right against the promisor. The beneficiary can enforce that right without joining the 
promise in an action against the promisor for damages or specific performance.”214 
                                            
209.  See Carlos J. Bianchi, A Look at Some Recurring Issues in Investment Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., 
May/July 2012, at 63, 66 (2012) (“In effect, the alchemy of consent renders the investor a third-party 
beneficiary of the BIT.”). Using government contracts as an analogue, such a provision manifests 
the intention of the government to bestow a right on the individual, thus meeting the stricter third-
party beneficiary test for government contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 
(1981). For a discussion, see Waters, supra note 205. 
210.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 203, at 678 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981)).  
211.  Id. See also Bianchi, supra note 209, at 66. The law of third-party beneficiaries further permits 
making of a promise for third-parties if the “beneficiary’s identity can be determined at the time the 
promise is to be performed.” FARNSWORTH, supra note 203, at 679. 
212.  Born, supra note 59, at 831–43. 
213.  See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 45 (Feb. 5) (“The Court 
would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise 
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right 
that the state is asserting. . . . The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its 
protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this 
respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a 
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. Since the claim of the State is not identical 
with that of the individual or corporate person whose cause is espoused, the State enjoys complete 
freedom of action.”). 
214.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 203, at 692. 
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The result of applying the appropriate contract law analysis to the denunciation of 
investment protection treaties forces the opposite conclusion from the one advocated by the 
offer and acceptance model. Under a third-party beneficiary analysis, the rights of the 
beneficiary can, if at all, only be modified or discharged by agreement between the promisor 
and the promisee.215 In the context of the denunciation of a bilateral investment treaty, the 
unilateral act of terminating that treaty is irrelevant as such because it is not an act of 
rescission, modification, or discharge agreed upon by both treaty parties.216 The act of 
terminating the treaty is only important in so far as it triggers other provisions in the 
principal “contract,” which here is the investment treaty, under which the investor is a 
beneficiary.217 Typically, this importance comes from the sunset provision in international 
investment agreements.218 By virtue of these sunset provisions, existing investments will be 
covered for an additional period of ten to fifteen years—and investors will maintain a right to 
claim for breach of the treaty for that period.219 Further, the termination notice itself may not 
cut off the protections for investments made after its issuance: the termination provisions 
themselves may permit new beneficiaries to grandfather into the sunset period within the 
termination period.220 
Similarly, denunciation of the ICSID Convention cannot have the effect of foreclosing 
ICSID as a potential forum for dispute resolution under a bilateral investment treaty. The 
principal contract—the BIT—gives the investor a right to pursue a claim at ICSID. 
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention while the BIT is in force violates that right. The 
investor has a right to specific enforcement of the ICSID arbitration option. Put differently, 
depriving the investor of such recourse is tantamount to denying the investor third-party 
beneficiary status in the first place.221 
Under a third-party beneficiary analysis, consent by the host state to ICSID arbitration 
vested in the investor, whether or not the investor also consented in writing to ICSID 
jurisdiction. It is the vesting of the right to arbitration, not the consent to arbitration, that 
binds the state not to withdraw its consent. It is the divestiture of the consent that positively 
requires the consent of the investor. Consequently, any act that de facto divests the investor 
of a right the investor cannot be deprived de lege without its consent is a bad faith act.222 The 
                                            
215.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981) (noting that in the absence of a term limiting 
their ability to do so, the promisor and promisee retain the power to discharge or modify the duty 
owed the beneficiary by subsequent agreement). 
216.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
217.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
218.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
219.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
220.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
221.  This is the reason that arbitration provisions are specifically enforceable by third-party 
beneficiaries. See supra notes198–99.  
222.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981) (“Subterfuges and evasions violate the 
obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But 
the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may 
require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the 
following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the 
spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, 
abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's 
performance.”) For further discussion of the concept of good faith in the comparative law context, see 
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state cannot be given the benefit of its own bad faith, meaning that the host state cannot 
raise its denunciation as a jurisdictional defense against vested investors, a conclusion that is 
consistent with the plain language of Article 72 of the ICSID Convention.223  
This result is markedly different from the offer-and-acceptance approach, which posits 
that the host state can readily revoke an offer to arbitrate at its discretion.224 The third-party 
beneficiary analysis concludes that this is not the case because the state has entered into an 
obligation with the home state to make arbitration available to covered investors.225 This 
principal obligation turns a “revocation” of the offer to arbitrate into a breach of the principal 
contract.226 The investor has a right to claim for specific performance of that contract—
including the arbitration clause.227 Thus, the promise in an investment treaty to arbitrate is 
insulated from discretionary derogation by the host state. 
Third-party beneficiary law does rely on an offer-and-acceptance analogy in the very 
limited context of determining the consequence of a modification or discharge of the principal 
contract by promisor and promisee for the rights of the third-party beneficiary. As the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains, the contracting parties to the principal contract 
retain some freedom to change their bargain.228 The parties’ power to modify or discharge 
their bargain “terminates when the beneficiary, before he receives notification of the 
discharge or modification” either “materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the 
promise” or “brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at the request of the promisor or 
promisee.”229 As the comments to the restatement clarify, the rule regarding assent “rests in 
part on an analogy to the law of offer-and-acceptance and in part on the probability that the 
beneficiary will rely in ways difficult or impossible to prove.”230 
Vesting of rights in the investor under an international investment treaty is significant 
only in the context of an agreed upon change in the treaty instrument. In that context, an 
analogy to the law of third-party beneficiaries would require that the vested rights remain 
unaffected by the change in the agreed upon scope of the bilateral investment treaty.231 Thus, 
if two contracting parties agree upon an amendment to a bilateral investment treaty, or agree 
upon an interpretation that modifies its original scope, such changes have effect only 
                                                                                                                  
E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, 
Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47 (1995); Saul 
Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (1997). 
223. See supra Part II.A.2. 
224. See supra Part II.B.1. 
225. See supra Part II.B.2. 
226. See supra Part II.B.2. 
227. See supra Part II.B.2. 
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981). 
229. Id. § 311(3).  
230. Id. § 311 cmt. h. 
231. See, e.g., Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third Party 
Beneficiary Contracts, UTAH L. REV. 1993, at 67, 67–68 (1993) (proposing “a test for third party 
standing based on the promisee’s intent to benefit the third party, the promisor’s knowledge of that 
intent, and the promisor’s contractual undertaking (duty) to provide the benefit to the third party”); 
Joseph Siprut, Third-Party Beneficiary Basics: When Can Noncontracting Parties Sue for Breach?, 
93 ILL. B.J. 462, 465 (2005) (“[T]he original parties to the contract retain the right to discharge or 
modify the rights of third-party beneficiaries, without that third-party’s assent, until those rights 
vest in the third-party.”). 
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prospectively for investors that have not yet ratified their rights, acted in reliance, or 
commenced proceedings under that treaty.232 The concept of the vesting of rights means that 
the contracting parties to the BIT have entirely abrogated their ability to amend, interpret, or 
affect the rights of investor-beneficiaries once vested through acceptance or reliance.233  
In sum, if a contractual analogy is relevant to the denunciation of investment protection 
treaties or the ICSID Convention, the analogy must be to the law of third-party beneficiaries 
rather than the law of offer-and-acceptance. The analogy to third-party beneficiaries is more 
appropriate than the analogy to offer-and-acceptance because it accounts of the existing 
principal relationship between the host state and the home state upon the basis of which the 
investor could file suit. This relationship is ignored entirely in the offer-and-acceptance model 
in a way that is fundamentally inconsistent with the law of contract on which it relies for 
inspiration. The consequence of relying on the law of third-party beneficiaries is the 
recognition that investors in fact have rights under bilateral investment treaties—and to 
delineate these rights against the rights of the treaty states to change their bargain at a later 
point in time. Because of these investor rights, denunciation of a BIT or of the ICSID 
Convention is without immediate consequence. 
3. Practice of Denunciations of the ICSID Convention Reveals an 
Additional Practical Shortcoming of the Offer and Acceptance Model 
The practice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention reveals an additional shortcoming in 
the offer and acceptance model. That model assumes that denunciation of a treaty is an 
effective revocation so long as it has been communicated in accordance with the respective 
treaty mechanisms.234 In actual practice, denunciation of, for example, the ICSID Convention 
is properly notified for a period of days to the ICSID Secretariat before it is communicated to 
the general public.235 The offer-and-acceptance model cannot appropriately account for the 
                                            
232.  Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 386 (Sept. 28, 
2007), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC694_En&caseId=C8 (“[E]ven if this interpretation were shared today by both parties to the 
Treaty, it still would not result in a change of its terms. States are of course free to amend the 
Treaty by consenting to another text, but this would not affect rights acquired under the Treaty by 
investors or other beneficiaries. In fact, Article XIV of the Treaty provides that in case of 
termination, the investment will continue to be protected under its provisions ‘for a further period of 
ten years.’ So too, with reference to rights protected under the Energy Charter Treaty, the tribunal 
in Plama has held that any denial of advantages to which an investor might have rights ‘should not 
have retrospective effect,’ as such a situation would result in making legitimate expectations false at 
a much later date.”); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 337 (May 22, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/Enron-Award.pdf. 
233.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311(3) (1981). In practice, the concept of vesting of third-
party beneficiary rights can be analogized to BIT practice because assent is manifested either by 
ratification or commencement of a legal action (including an arbitration). Ratification would occur at 
the time the investor would inform the host state of its consent to arbitrate disputes under the 
treaty at ICSID. See Drury v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 262 P.3d 1162, 1166 & n.5 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2011) (noting that the right to modify a bargain including third-party beneficiaries must 
consider assent “for example, by ratifying it or asserting a claim for relief under the agreement” and 
referring expressly to assent “to a contract containing an arbitration clause”). 
234.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 1285; SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35 1280–82. 
235.  See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
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status of the “offer” to arbitrate during the window in which the denunciation was under 
review in accordance with the treaty mechanism but not yet notified to investors.  
Remaining within the offer and acceptance metaphor, the practice of denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention reveals a mailbox problem. In the U.S. common law of contracts, the 
mailbox rule provides that an acceptance mailed by an offeree prior to his receipt of a 
communication revoking an offer is effective and concludes a contract.236 The power to accept 
terminates upon receipt of a revocation if received before any acceptance is mailed.237 Here, 
the problem is the investor (or, offeree for purposes of offer and acceptance) is not in fact a 
recipient of a direct communication by the host state. The investor is not even an indirect 
recipient of a communication from the host state because neither the ICSID Convention nor 
bilateral investment treaties impose any obligation upon the ICSID Secretariat or the home 
state to communicate a treaty denunciation broadly.238 Rather, both do so as a matter of 
administrative convenience.239 
The mailbox problem could be overcome by press statements made by relevant 
government officials because presumably the original offer had been a “general offer”—one 
made by “other general notification to the public.”240 But reliance on such statements 
exacerbates the problem: the relevant statement to consider would be a “manifestation of an 
intention not to enter into the proposed contract.”241 High-ranking Venezuelan and 
Ecuadorian officials repeatedly made such statements prior to the denunciation of the ICSID 
                                            
236.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981). Cf. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (“An 
acceptance of an offer becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror. 
An acceptance is not effective if the indication of assent does not reach the offeror within the time he 
has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time, due account being taken of the 
circumstances of the transaction, including the rapidity of the means of communication employed by 
the offeror. An oral offer must be accepted immediately unless the circumstances indicate 
otherwise.”); compare Larry A. DiMatteo & Daniel T. Ostas, Comparative Efficiency in International 
Sales Law, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 371, 379 (2011) (noting that the Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods adopts “the civil law’s receipt rule for the effectiveness of acceptances over the 
common law's dispatch or mailbox rule” (citation omitted)).  
237.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981). 
238.  ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 75(f) (“The depositary shall notify all signatory States of the 
following: . . . denunciations in accordance with Article 71.” (emphasis added)); Neth-Venez. BIT, 
supra note 161, art. 14(1) (stating with regard to manner of communication that “Contracting 
Parties” must “notif[y] each other in writing”). 
239.  For this reason, the communication does not meet the requirements for revocation of a general offer. 
Restatement of Contracts (Second), section forty-six provides,  
Where an offer is made by advertisement in a newspaper or other general notification to the 
public or to a number of persons whose identity is unknown to the offeror, the offeree’s 
power of acceptance is terminated when a notice of termination is given publicity by 
advertisement or other general notification equal to that given to the offer and no better 
means of notification is reasonably available. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 46 (1981). The communication of denunciation to the 
other respective states is not a notification to the general public. The modification of the mailbox 
rule with regard to revocation of general offers by publication thus is not applicable to the 
problem at hand because there is no publication mechanism in the first place. 
240.  Id.; see also Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73, 76 (1875) (accepting revocation of a reward for 
information leading to the capture of a fugitive so long as the offer of a reward “was withdrawn 
through the same channel in which it was made” and the “same notoriety was given to the 
revocation that was given to the offer”). 
241.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1981). 
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Convention and BITs.242 If such statements are a revocation of an offer to arbitrate—and 
consequently the protections afforded to an investor by a BIT—revocation did not require 
denunciation of the ICSID Convention and would have preceded the majority of claims filed 
at ICSID against Venezuela.243 The fact that this argument was not even raised by Venezuela 
in these proceedings confirms the absurdity of this conception.244 
This mailbox problem confirms that one cannot look to ICSID arbitration, particularly 
ICSID arbitration pursuant to international investment agreements, from the point of view of 
offer-and-acceptance. Such proceedings—and the protections on which they rely—lack 
privity.245 It is therefore unsurprising that the rules of contract formation simply will not fit 
them. Instead, the ICSID system has to account for arbitration without privity and should 
analogize the law of third-party beneficiaries as the closest analogue. 246 
4. The Offer-and-Acceptance Model Contradicts the Terms of Both 
International Investment Agreements and the ICSID Convention  
The offer and acceptance approach is fundamentally at odds with clear treaty language in 
both bilateral investment treaties and the ICSID Convention. This approach posits that an 
offer to arbitrate is revoked immediately upon receipt of the notice of withdrawal.247 This is 
inconsistent with provisions in both BITs and the ICSID Convention governing the manner in 
which a state party can withdraw from the respective treaties.248 This is further support that 
the offer and acceptance model is fundamentally incapable of explaining the consequences of 
withdrawal by a host state from its treaty obligations in place when an investment was made. 
BITs in particular have relatively complex denunciation mechanisms. In the case of the 
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, for instance, the state parties could not withdraw from the 
treaty for the period of its initial validity of fifteen years.249 A notice of withdrawal from the 
treaty in, for example, year six or seven of the treaty’s initial term would not have had effect 
for several years as a matter of international law.250 Not so under the offer and acceptance 
model: the term protects only the treaty parties, not the investor in its conception.251 
                                            
242.  See, e.g., Mark Weisbrot, IMF and World Bank Face Declining Authority as Venezuela Announces 
Withdrawal, HUFFINGTON POST (May 3, 2007), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weisbrot/imf-
and-world-bank-face-d_b_47562.html. 
243.  See, e.g., id. Venezuela’s withdrawal from ICSID was notified to ICSID in January 2012. Venezuela 
Notice, supra note 154. 
244.  See Mobil Corp. Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1510_En&caseId=C256; CEMEX Caracas Inv. B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 30, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1831_En&caseId=C420. 
245.  See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 232 (1995). 
246.  Id. 
247.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 1285; SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 1280–82. 
248.  See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 71; Neth-Venez. BIT, supra note 161, art. 14(1). 
249.  Neth-Venez. BIT, supra note 161, art. 14(1). 
250.  Id. 
251.  SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 1285; SCHREUER 2009, supra note 35, at 1280–82. 
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This result of the offer and acceptance model is highly implausible. Currently, BITs are 
almost exclusively enforced through proceedings brought by international investors.252 
Withdrawal periods differ significantly between different investment treaties.253 The offer 
and acceptance model would render the withdrawal periods practically meaningless despite 
the fact that treaty parties bargain for greater or lesser withdrawal rights in actual treaty 
practice.254 They would be far less likely to do so if they considered the point to be arbitrary or 
superfluous. 
The denunciation mechanism of the ICSID Convention is similarly inconsistent with the 
offer and acceptance approach. The ICSID Convention provides that a denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention takes effect six months after receipt by the ICSID Secretariat of a notice of 
withdrawal.255 Given the ICSID Convention’s sole purpose to make available a dispute 
resolution forum to investors, neutering the denunciation period is again highly 
implausible.256 
                                            
252.  BIT arbitrations between states are exceedingly rare. Reported instances have involved the United 
States and Peru, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, the United States and Ecuador, and Italy 
and Cuba. See Italy v. Cuba, Interim Award (Ad Hoc Arb. Trib. Mar. 15, 2005), IIC 518 (2011); 
MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 33 (discussing the United States/Peru and Czech Republic/ 
Netherlands proceedings); Dapo Akande, Ecuador v. United States Inter-State Arbitration under a 
BIT: How to Interpret the Word “Interpretation”?, EUR. J. INT’L L. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/ecuador-v-united-states-inter-state-arbitration-under-a-bit-how-to-interpret-
the-word-interpretation/.  
253.  See, e.g., Agreement between Japan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the Promotion 
and Protection of Investment, Japan-Pak., art. 14(3), Mar. 10, 1998, U.N. Registration No. 48366, 
(“In respect of investments and returns acquired prior to the date of termination of the present 
Agreement, the provisions of Articles 1 to 13 shall continue to be effective for a further period of 
fifteen years from the date of termination of the present Agreement.”), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/48366/Part/I-48366-
08000002802d0152.pdf.; Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the 
Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Alg.-Fr., art. 12, Feb. 13, 1993, 2336 U.N.T.S. 215 (“Upon termination of 
the period of validity of this Agreement, investments made while it was in force shall continue to 
enjoy the protection of its provisions for an additional period of fifteen years.”); Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XIV(3), Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No 103-2 (1991) 
(“With respect to investments made or acquired prior to the date of termination of this Treaty and to 
which this Treaty otherwise applies, the provisions of all of the other Articles of this Treaty shall 
thereafter continue to be effective for a further period of ten years from such date of termination.”).  
254.  See supra notes 246–50. 
255.  ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 71. 
256.  The early drafts of the Convention shed light on the concerns that gave rise to the period of six 
months specified in Article 71. The period was originally meant to address situations in which a 
state had objected to a modification of the Convention, which nevertheless had been passed by the 
Contracting States to the Convention. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, Article IX, Comment, (Oct. 
15, 1963), in 2-1 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION II, supra note 38, at 229 [hereinafter 
Preliminary Draft] (“No provision is made regarding States which oppose the amendment after its 
adoption. It would, however, always be open to a State to declare its withdrawal from the 
Convention under Section 5 of Article XI. The period specified for effectiveness of the denunciation 
could be made to conform to the period required for the effectiveness of the amendment adopted, 
thus permitting a State which wished to denounce the treaty to do so immediately following 
adoption of the amendment and thereby avoid becoming subject to the Convention as amended. The 
proviso in Section 2 ensures that amendments will not have retroactive effect.”). In those 
circumstances, a state was to be given a chance to escape unwanted changes in the Convention by 
making the period for denunciation of the Convention equal to the 6 month period for modifications 
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In conclusion, despite being widely espoused, the offer-and-acceptance model 
fundamentally fails as a model of investment protection. Its analogy is ill-chosen because it 
does not account for the fact that investors are third parties to BITs and most other forms of 
investment protection instruments but acquire rights under them. Thus, the analogy to draw 
to the law of contract runs to the law of third-party beneficiaries rather than offer and 
acceptance. Further, offer-and-acceptance runs into mailbox problems with regard to the 
receipt of a denunciation notification precisely because the investor is not the intended 
recipient of that communication. The lack of a treaty-mandated means of communicating 
denunciations to investors thus further weakens the analogy to the law of offer-and-
acceptance. Finally, the offer-and-acceptance model is incongruous with treaty provisions 
governing denunciation. These mechanisms do not give immediate effect to withdrawal 
notices. The offer-and-acceptance model on the other hand requires to the contrary that such 
denunciations immediately extinguish investor rights. 
C. Current Practice Reveals the Failure of the “Firm Offer” Model of 
Investment Protection 
Emmanuel Gaillard developed an alternative offer-and-acceptance model that remedies 
some of the problems of the that approach.257 Professor Gaillard’s approach addresses 
principally denunciation of the ICSID Convention.258 It can, however, be analogized more 
broadly to denunciation of investment protection obligations in general. 
1. The “Firm Offer” Model of Investment Protection  
Professor Gaillard developed a “firm offer” model of investment protection to avoid the 
chief pitfalls of the offer-and-acceptance approach.259 His analysis begins with Article 72 of 
                                                                                                                  
to become effective. See id. at 229. Given the requirement under Article 66(1) that agreement must 
be ratified by all contracting states, the concern about amendments that was at the core of the 
drafter’s discussion of denunciation has been described by a leading commentator as otiose. See 
SCHREUER 2001, supra note 35, at 1283–84. The logic was that any obligation incurred by the 
state in this pendency period would still be governed by the old, unmodified Convention, even if this 
obligation had consequences under the Convention beyond the notice period. See Preliminary Draft, 
supra note 38, at 229. Concretely, if a state would be subject to suit after both its denunciation and 
the modification, this obligation would be considered to have been incurred before the denunciation 
had become effective and would thus be governed by the Convention as it stood before its 
modification. See also Diane Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and 
Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239, 261 (2012) (“The view that investors can file claims 
in ICSID during the six-month notification period, but not after, seems to have prevailed.”). 
257.  Emmanuel Gaillard, The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, 237 N.Y. L.J. 3 (June 26, 2007). 
258.  Id. 
259.  See id. at 8. Thomas Wälde has addressed the same issue in a similar fashion in Investment 
Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty—From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation, 
12 ARB. INT’L 429, 450 n.81 (1996); see also Bianchi, supra note 209; Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private 
Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition among International Economic Law 
Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 268–71 (2007) (endorsing Professor Gaillard’s 
view); Christian Tietje et al., Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID, 74 
BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (Mar. 2008) (Ger.), available at 
http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft74.pdf (explaining that 
the U.K.-Bol. BIT provides an agreement to consent because it uses UNCITRAL arbitration as the 
default dispute resolution mechanism). 
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the ICSID Convention. Premised upon that article, Gaillard’s model distinguishes between 
“unqualified consent” and mere “agreement to consent.”260 According to this model, 
denunciation is without effect to the extent that a firm consent had already been given in an 
IIA, whereas termination of the ICSID Convention would deprive the investor of an 
opportunity to have recourse to ICSID once denunciation became effective under an IIA, 
which merely included an offer to arbitrate at ICSID.261  
The difference between an unqualified consent and an agreement to consent turns on the 
drafting of the arbitration provision in a BIT.262 An unqualified consent by its terms leaves no 
doubt that a dispute “shall be submitted” to ICSID arbitration.263 Professor Gaillard describes 
the agreement to consent by way of the following example: 
 Article 8 of the Bolivia-UK BIT of May 24, 1988 . . . provides that disputes 
‘shall . . . be submitted to international arbitration if either party to the dispute so 
wishes’ but adds that ‘[w]here the dispute is referred to international arbitration, the 
investor and the contracting Party concerned in the dispute may agree to refer the 
dispute either to [ICSID or ICC or ad hoc arbitration],’ which is an indication that a 
further agreement is necessary before the initiation of an ICSID arbitration (with 
UNCITRAL arbitration being the fallback position if no agreement is reached after a 
period of six months from written notification of the claim).264 
The focus on the language of the BIT should apply equally in the context of denunciation of 
a bilateral investment agreement. In that context, unqualified consent would survive for the 
sunset period of the bilateral investment treaty. Agreements to consent, however, arguably 
would not, as the host state would now have acted in a manner that is fundamentally 
inconsistent with reaching the requisite agreement to create the consent. Denunciation of 
those treaties, as a matter of logic, should deprive the investor of rights to claim after the 
denunciation has taken effect but before the sunset period has run. 
The starting point for this model is the offer-and-acceptance approach. For example, it is 
premised on the following conception of the history of the ICSID Convention: 
Such consent may traditionally be given in an arbitration clause contained in a contract 
or through a compromise once the dispute has arisen. It may also be given separately 
by the host state and the investor, the latter accepting, at the time the dispute has 
arisen, the prior and general consent to arbitration given by the former in a provision of 
its domestic legislation or in an investment protection treaty.265 
Rather than break with offer-and-acceptance as the paradigm of investment protection, 
Professor Gaillard’s model treats BITs as potential firm offers, or options. In the context of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, a firm offer is an offer in writing between merchants that will 
be left open by its terms for a reasonable period of time.266 This is the basic approach of civil 
                                            
260.  See supra note 259. 
261.  See supra note 259. 
262.  See Gaillard, supra note 257, at 8. 
263.  Id. 
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law jurisdiction like, for example, Germany.267 Contract law codification projects based on 
comparative law have adopted the civilian approach, so long as it is reasonable for a party to 
rely on the firmness of such an offer for a reasonable period of time.268 
The “firm offer” model significantly improves the offer-and-acceptance model. It addresses 
the problem that BITs as well as the ICSID Convention have specific mechanisms governing 
withdrawal. It enforces these mechanisms in an evenhanded manner with regard to both the 
home state and the foreign investor. By enforcing the terms of the treaties in question, the 
“firm offer” approach further permits the investor to take advantage of sunset provisions in 
BITs. These improvements are significant as compared to the offer-and-acceptance model 
because they facially fit a conception of offer-and-acceptance within the textual framework of 
the ICSID Convention. 
2. The Firm Offer Model Incorrectly Assumes that IIAs Only Protect 
Investors if Investors “Accept” Their Protection 
The “firm offer” model only apparently resolves the problem posed by the simple offer-and-
acceptance model. The problem of the firm offer model is revealed in the context of the 
denunciation of BITs. The withdrawal from a BIT follows the same firm offer logic as the 
withdrawal from the ICSID Convention; for example, the withdrawal does revoke agreements 
to consent, but does not revoke unqualified consent.269 One of the key distinctions between an 
agreement to consent and actual consent is the availability of several options, all of which 
would require party agreement.270 
The distinction between unqualified consents and agreements to consent risks proving too 
much. Thus, a denunciation of a BIT that contains several options of investor-state dispute 
resolution is on its face inconsistent with an agreement to any form of dispute resolution.271 A 
denunciation thus would frustrate each of these options in turn, and as such deprive the 
investor of any recourse immediately.272 Such a result would be absurd—and is not intended 
by the “firm offer” approach which employs a BIT example that provides a non-ICSID default 
arbitration mechanism for the settlement of investor-state dispute resolution.273 
                                            
267.  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 42, as 
amended, § 145 (Ger.), translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p0428 (“Any person who offers to another to enter into 
a contract is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being bound by it.”). 
268.  UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INT’L COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 2.1.4(2)(b) (Int’l Inst. for the 
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271.  U.S.-Bolivia BIT, supra note 187, art. IX, (“(a) Provided that the national or company concerned has 
not submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b), and that three months have 
elapsed from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may submit 
the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration: (i) to the Centre, if the Centre is available; or (ii) to 
the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not available; or (iii) in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or (iv) if agreed by both parties to the dispute, to any other 
arbitration institution or in accordance with any other arbitration rules.”). 
272.  See Gaillard, supra note 257, at 7. 
273.  See id. (“Article IX of the Bolivia-US BIT of April 17, 1998 provides for ICSID arbitration as one of 
the many options offered to the investors, Article IX(4) stating that ‘[e]ach Party hereby consents to 
the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by binding arbitration’ in accordance with 
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On the other hand, the distinction may well prove too little if it were reinterpreted to 
address this criticism. If an unqualified consent is understood to mean a consent to 
arbitration on the basis of which an investor could have commenced an arbitration 
irrespective of a denunciation, the model explains nothing at all. It is obvious that 
denunciation of a treaty instrument cannot grant investors additional rights. Consequently, 
on this conception, all BIT provisions permitting an investor to commence an ICSID 
arbitration would be an unqualified consent. The view that there is a division of firm offers 
and ordinary offers and inherent textual distinguishability would fail: there are only firm 
offers to arbitrate and statements that are not offers to arbitrate at all. 
Treating all consents as firm offers is a potential minefield because it does not explain on 
what basis the treaty parties could modify their bargain through amendments or joint 
interpretations of the treaty. On its face, a firm offer would remain open until its original 
expiration date. It could not be revoked or modified prior to that date. This excludes any 
possibility of modification by the treaty parties—without any explanation of how or why the 
investor so constrained the traditional freedom of action of treaty parties in the law of 
treaties.274 
Thus, while the “firm offer” model is certainly preferable to the simple offer-and-
acceptance model, it ultimately, too, fails to account for the triangular international law 
relationship between investor, host state, and home state. To understand the consequence of 
the denunciation of international investment treaties, the international legal repercussions of 
this triangular relationship is key. The next Section will reconstruct the international law of 
consent and explain its repercussions on the effect of denunciation of international 
investment agreements. 
III. Keep the Faith—The Limited Relevance of Termination of 
 Investment Agreements 
The approaches surveyed to withdrawal from international investment agreements so far 
have focused on the action of forming an arbitration agreement. These approaches have failed 
to provide a satisfactory account of the protection of foreign investments in large measure 
because they ignore the act of the state in granting rights, or rights of action, directly to 
foreign investors. This Section will provide an alternative conception of international 
investment law that, to paraphrase Ronald Dworkin, takes international legal rights 
seriously.275 This conception of international legal rights is premised upon the appropriate 
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274.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 25, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
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contract law analogy—third-party beneficiaries—but adapts that premise to the context of 
public international law.276  
The consent to arbitration with foreign investors is an independent international legal 
obligation of the host state. This obligation bestows definitive international legal rights on 
foreign investors. These obligations cannot be undercut by unilateral action of the host state. 
They further can only be modified without the consent of the investor to the extent that the 
rights have not fully vested. Subsection A lays out the law of consent and the effect of 
termination of bilateral investment treaties. Subsection B addresses the termination of the 
ICSID Convention.  
A. Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
A key reason that termination of international investment agreements (whether the 
ICSID Convention or BITs) creates controversy and confusion is that these treaties create a 
system of international rights “without privity.”277 These international law agreements 
bestow direct rights of action upon actors that do not traditionally have standing as a matter 
of international law.278 These treaties therefore appear to create an entirely new legal domain 
between the classic international law of diplomatic protection and the mundane contract law 
governing large transactions in which one party happens to be a state.  
International law is the prevailing force in this domain. The clear trend from disputes 
predating the BIT paradigm was toward the internationalization of investment protection.279 
The inclusion of arbitration clauses and choice of law provisions in contracts between foreign 
investors and a foreign state or foreign state instrumentalities created international legal 
obligations owed by the state directly to the investor.280 Bilateral and multilateral investment 
agreements granting direct rights to foreign investors against their host state accelerated the 
same trend.281 The question of denunciation of BITs will thus have to be analyzed first and 
foremost through this prism. 
1. Consent to Arbitration as Treaty Obligation 
State consent to international arbitration with foreign investors in a BIT is a treaty 
obligation of the state making it.282 Just like any other treaty obligation, the consent 
                                                                                                                  
Arbitrations, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. (forthcoming 2013). Rather, it takes the approach as 
a starting point only. 
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278.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
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provisions in a BIT require good faith compliance.283 A failure to comply with the consent 
obligation is a violation of the treaty akin to any other breach of an international treaty.284 
Consents to dispute resolution by international bodies in treaties constitute free-standing 
international obligations.285 The nature of consent to jurisdiction as an international 
obligation is reflected in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. In the Case 
Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, the Court explained that “every State 
which makes a Declaration of Acceptance must be deemed to take into account the possibility 
that, under the Statute, it may at any time find itself subjected to the obligations of the 
Optional Clause in relation to a new Signatory.”286 This holding has been applied through the 
jurisprudence of the International Court.287 
That consent to dispute resolution is a true obligation rather than a discretionary choice 
on the part of the respondent state is a key premise of international law doctrine. Hersch 
Lauterpacht, first and foremost, convincingly defended a strong obligatory consent theory by 
reference to both a long practice of international courts and tribunals and as a matter of 
logic.288 That is, Professor Lauterpacht submitted that dispute resolution is only a meaningful 
proposition if it is in fact obligatory, as any contrary position would push dispute resolution to 
the vanishing point.289 The discretionary position would allow states to frustrate the 
obligation to submit to dispute resolution, courts and tribunals would fulfill a purely 
ministerial, allocative role to facilitate and execute an agreement already reached by the 
parties to a dispute rather than actually resolve the dispute.290 The practice of the 
International Court of Justice, as well as international tribunals is consistent with this 
traditional position.291 
The potential for confusion arises principally because breach of a consent obligation seeks 
to deprive others of a judicial or arbitral forum in which that very breach could be prosecuted. 
A potential violation, or breach, of any other treaty provision does not seek to frustrate the 
availability of a forum in which to hear claims, but invites resolution of the dispute whether a 
treaty breach occurs. This is precisely what a state violating its earlier consent to 
international dispute resolution would seek to avoid. Jurisprudence of the court and doctrine 
are firmly on the side of enforcing the consent due to the good faith obligation of the state to 
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submit to dispute resolution.292 Taking the right to dispute resolution seriously, state action 
seeking to frustrate it ipso facto cannot be successful.293 
2. The Impregilo Challenge 
An account focused on the treaty obligation itself is insufficient to explain why investors 
continue to benefit from the consent provision in investment treaties even after their 
denunciation. Oscar Garibaldi provided the principal account focused primarily upon the law 
of treaties.294 That account agreed with the premise of the Preliminary Comment that only an 
international law model could explain the nature of state consent to arbitration.295 It 
disagreed with the Preliminary Comment because it considered that the treaty analysis of 
pacta sunt servanda in its own right sufficed to explain why the denunciation of treaties could 
not affect investor rights of action until after expiry of the sunset period in the treaty.296 
An account relying exclusively on the law of treaties fails to explain how an investor’s 
rights, including the right to dispute resolution, are protected from state action. The most 
immediate practical problem for a purely treaty-based model is that the home state and the 
host state can agree to terminate the investor’s right to arbitration by amendment or 
modification.297  
The first challenge arises immediately out of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Under the Vienna Convention, state parties to a treaty remain free to modify or 
amend their agreement. Article 54 of the Vienna Convention provides that the “termination 
of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place” not only in conformity with its 
provisions governing denunciation, but also “at any time by consent of all the parties after 
consultation with the other contracting States.”298 Article 39 provides that a “treaty may be 
amended by agreement between the parties.”299  
Recent jurisprudence has shown a willingness to estop investors on the basis of actions 
relating to the treaty undertaken by their home state.300 In one instance, this estoppel had 
jurisdictional implications, depriving an investor-state tribunal of jurisdiction over a claim.301 
                                            
292.  Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 146 (Nov. 26); see also Nolan 
& Sourgens, supra note 282. 
293.  LAUTERPACHT, supra note 159, at 71–77, 159–61, 359–90. 
294.  Oscar M. Garibaldi, On the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction, 
and the Limits of the Contract Analogy, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 251–77 (Christina Binder et al., eds, 2009). 
Cf. Michael D. Nolan & Frédéric G. Sourgens, A Preliminary Comment—The Interplay between 
State Consent to ICSID Arbitration and Denunciation of the ICSID Convention: The (Possible) 
Venezuela Case Study, 5 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/9/5/956/TDM_Nolan_Sourgens_Milbank.pdf. 
295.  Garibaldi, supra note 294. 
296.  Id. at 263, 268–70, n.55. But cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 274, art. 26 (“Article 26 ‘Pacta sunt 
servanda:’ Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith.”). 
297.  Vienna Convention, supra note 274, art. 39. 
298.  Id. art. 54(b). 
299.  Id. art. 39. 
300.  HICEE B.V. v. Slovak Republic (Neth.-Solvk.), PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial Award (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. May 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/HICEEv.SlovakRepublicPartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf.  
301.  See id. 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2013) 
382 
The ability of states to change the scope of their treaty undertakings thus is very much a live 
issue.302 An account of the effect of denunciation of investment treaties must take account of 
this possibility. 
The modification-and-amendment issue is further exacerbated by the Vienna Convention’s 
provisions regarding the rights and obligations of third states. The Vienna Convention 
broadly states that a “treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State 
without its consent.”303 Where consent is given, “it is the separate, ‘collateral’ agreement 
between the treaty parties and the third State rather than the treaty itself which provides the 
legal basis for the obligation.”304 The default rule with regard to such rights is that an 
obligation may be revoked or amended by treaty parties unless it can be “established that the 
right was intended not be revocable or subject to modification.”305 This requires interpretation 
of the collateral agreement between the third State and the treaty parties in the context of 
the original treaty provision.306  
This regime is formally and functionally unfit to deal with the non-state rights that 
investors claim. Formally, investors are not states. To the extent they are covered by the 
Vienna Convention, it is by means of exclusion of its applicability.307 A heavily negotiated 
compromise dealing with the relationship between treaty parties and third States therefore is 
not formally inapposite.308 Functionally, it is highly unlikely that investors would conclude 
any collateral agreements under an international investment agreement, it being precisely an 
instrument operating without privity.309 The function of international investment agreements 
is to create conditions for investment that do not require further negotiation between 
investors and host states through a fixed set of rules mitigating the political risk of 
investing.310 The formal limitation of the Vienna Convention to state actors thus is 
functionally appropriate given the radically different mode of international intercourse of 
foreign investors when compared to states acquiring rights under treaties to which they are 
not parties. 
The treaty perspective invites a second, related challenge, initially proposed by Professor 
Schreuer’s offer-and-acceptance model. Professor Schreuer noted that treaty obligations of the 
host states were owed to the home state of the investor.311 Withdrawal of an offer to arbitrate 
by denunciation of an international treaty may violate a commitment to the investor’s home 
state.312 But the investor would be powerless to resist it precisely because the investor was 
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not the host state’s counterparty.313 As for the investor, the treaty remains an allocative 
mechanism to distribute a fixed pool of assets set aside by the state to qualified investors. The 
state would be at liberty to cancel this mechanism at its discretion, subject only to claims for 
damages by the home state under the state-to-state dispute resolution provisions of the 
treaties in question. 
Professor Schreuer’s privity-based treaty argument received support from the recent 
Impregilo dissent and other decisions like it. The principal submission of these opinions is to 
distinguish between investor rights and access to those rights by means of international 
dispute resolution. Importantly for current purposes, the Impregilo dissent noted that 
 It does appear that on the international level no automatic assimilation can be made 
between substantive rights and jurisdictional means to enforce them, the qualifying 
conditions for access to the substantive rights and the qualifying conditions for access to 
the jurisdictional means being different.314 
Denunciation of a treaty thus could leave intact the substantive rights of investors covered 
immediately by the sunset provision while simultaneously cancelling the qualifying 
conditions for access to jurisdiction ratione voluntatis.  
The Impregilo dissent’s conception would further withstand the argument that withdrawal 
of access to jurisdiction constitutes a violation of the treaty in its own right. Like the Schreuer 
analysis, this view implies that the substantive right to arbitration contained in the treaty 
cannot be assimilated to the availability of a forum in which the investor could advance a 
cause of action asserting the wrongful withdrawal of consent to arbitration. This substantive 
right ultimately could only be redeemed by the home state.315 There is thus no investor right 
of access to arbitration in this conception of investor state arbitration.  
The Impregilo challenge reveals that the law of treaties on its own does not justify why 
consents to arbitration survive the initial notice of termination of a treaty. In fact, as this 
analysis reveals, the law of treaties focuses on the relationship between the treaty parties at 
the exclusion of the investor.316 The law of treaties therefore cannot alone determine the 
consequence of a treaty obligation for the rights of the investor. It either has to assume that 
there is no such consequence, per Professor Schreuer’s model, or it has to assume that there is 
some consequence, per Mr. Garibaldi’s model. But this assumption is not fundamentally 
borne of the law of treaties itself. An additional element is needed to complete the analysis.  
3. The Nature of the Investor Right of Action 
Unilateral acts form the link between the treaty obligation to consent to arbitration, on the 
one hand, and the investor, on the other hand. A unilateral act is a “[d]eclaration[] publicly 
made and manifesting the will to be bound” that creates a legal obligation.317 The legal 
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obligation is premised upon good faith.318 Unilateral acts addressed to investors can be relied 
upon by investors and directly create international legal obligations between the home state, 
the host state, and investors.319 
The characterization of states’ commitments to international investors has good pedigree. 
It is consistent with the early draft conventions of the 1960s, first considering the possibility 
of standing consent to arbitration.320 These conventions expressly considered such standing 
consent to be a unilateral act of state.321 It is similarly consistent with the drafting history of 
the ICSID Convention, which expressly subscribed to a unilateral act paradigm as a starting 
point for the remainder of the Convention.322 
The commitments contained in investment treaties are clearly addressed to investors, and 
can therefore be relied upon by investors. The chief evidence to determine that investment 
treaties are addressed to investors is the dispute resolution mechanism included in these 
treaties.323 This mechanism provides that investors can commence claims against the host 
state of their investment for violation of treaty provisions.324 The dispute resolution 
mechanism thus unequivocally communicates that the investor is the intended beneficiary of 
the obligation incurred by the state.325 By making investors the intended beneficiary of the 
investment treaty, the treaty contains a unilateral act of the treaty parties addressed to the 
investor that creates independent legal rights in the investor.  
The unilateral act of the state, having created an international legal right arising from the 
treaty, is the legal explanation for the triangular relationship between the home state, the 
host state, and the investor. It translates the legal obligation between the treaty parties into a 
legal right of the investor by permitting the investor to rely on the undertaking contained in 
the treaty.  
This analysis so far is consistent with the third-party beneficiary analysis of contract 
law.326 The principal relationship between the home state and the host state gives rights to 
the intended beneficiaries, that is, to the investors. The intended beneficiaries are identified 
by the dispute resolution clause. Once the third-party rights vest, they become permanent. 
But the vesting mechanism differs in important respects on the international legal plane. 
By treating the consent as a unilateral act vis-à-vis the investor, it is possible to make 
sense as a matter of international law of how treaty rights vest in the investor as opposed to 
                                                                                                                  
11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/1; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/636/20/PDF/G0663620.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter ILC 
Guidelines]. 
318.  Id. 
319.  See id. princ. 6 (“Unilateral declarations may be addressed to the international community as a 
whole, to one or several States or to other entities.”); W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush Arsanjiani, 
The Question of Unilateral Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes, in 
VÖLKERRECHT ALS WERTORDNUNG—COMMON VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 409 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al., eds., 2006). 
320.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
321.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
322.  Broches, supra note 38, at 7 
323.  See supra Part I.B.3.b.2. 
324.  See supra Part I.B.3.b.2. 
325.  See supra Part I.B.3.b.2. 
326.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
Keep the Faith 
385 
creating an obligation of the host state exclusively towards the investor’s home state. The 
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Guiding Principles looks to reasonable reliance for 
determining whether the act can be revoked or modified.327 The test looks to an objective 
factor and a subjective factor to determine reasonable reliance.328  
The objective factor principally looks to the specific terms of the declaration relating to 
revocation.329 It also considers whether a reasonable addressee of the act would have relied 
upon it.330 Treating BITs as unilateral acts of the treaty parties vis-à-vis investors, the 
objective test creates a presumption that the undertaking cannot be revoked prior to the 
sunset period, because a reasonable investor would have relied upon the terms of the sunset 
period in making an investment decision.331 A revocation of the treaty, or a key part of the 
treaty such as the consent to investor-state dispute resolution provision, presumptively would 
not have effect within the sunset provision for existing investors by virtue of the law of 
unilateral acts. 
The subjective factor looks to actual reliance.332 In the context investment treaties, a factor 
in determining reliance is the choice by the investor of a specific investment structure.333 This 
                                            
327.  ILC Guidelines, supra note 317, at 380. 
328.  Id. 
329.  See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20). For a discussion, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM: GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1993); Brigitte Bollecker-Stern, L’Affaire des Essais Nucléaires Français 
Devant la Cour Internationale de Justice, 20 ANN. FR. DR. INT’L 299 (1974). 
330.  See ILC Guidelines, supra note 317, princ. 10(b). 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
333.  Investors have relied upon investment structures through third states in a significant number of 
cases. See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the 
Tribunal, (Oct. 2, 2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC648_En&caseId=C231 (Cypriot holding structure for Canadian and BVI parents); Bureau 
Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment & Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, (May 29, 2009) (Dutch holding 
structure for French parent); CEMEX Caracas Inv. B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 30, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1831_En&caseId=C420 (Dutch holding structure for Mexican parent); CME Czech Republic 
B.V. v. Czech Republic, Case No. 403/VERMERK/2001/CME, Partial Award, (Sept. 13, 2001), 
http://italaw.com/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf (Dutch holding structure for U.S. parent); 
Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, (Mar. 27, 2007), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_eastern_sugar.pdf (Dutch holding structure for French and British 
parents); Itera Int’l Energy LLC v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/7, Decision on Admissibility of 
Ancillary Claims, (Dec. 4, 2009), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1310_En&caseId=C302 (U.S. and Dutch holding company for Russian parent); Millicom Int’l 
Operations B.V. v. Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/20, Decision on Jurisdiction of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, ¶ 71 (July 16, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC2833_En&caseId=C500; Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, 
Decision on Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Apr. 18, 2008), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC697_En&caseId=C72 (Dutch holding structure for Romanian parent against Romania); Saluka 
Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, (Mar. 17, 2006) (Dutch holding structure for 
Japanese parent); Tidewater Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, 
Procedural Order No. 1 on Production of Documents, (Mar. 29, 2011), 
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choice would indicate that the investor relied upon the treaty in making the investment 
decision.334 Other probative evidence may include due diligence materials or other documents 
outlining the reasons for the investment decision.335 For a significant number of project 
investors, the fact of the investment provides additional evidence of reliance such that the 
investment treaty may not be substantially modified.  
Both the objective and subjective elements are consistent with the third-party beneficiary 
analysis of the law of contracts.336 It recognizes that rights once relied upon vest and thus no 
longer permits of material modification by the acts of one or both of the original contracting 
parties.337  
But the contractual analysis is supplemented and adapted to the international law 
plane.338 Rather than consider vesting to be an absolute bar to any and all discharge or 
modification of rights, it permits states reasonable room for policy adjustments to the extent 
that there has been a fundamental change in circumstances.339 Further, the objective and 
subjective elements of reliance must be considered individually for each case on the basis of 
the state action involved as well as the merit of the investor’s reliance.  
International law thus does not adopt a bright line approach, but adopts a balancing test 
that is cognizant of the relative weight of the interests of the investor beneficiaries of 
international investment agreements and the treaty parties. In the context of the unilateral 
denunciation of investment agreements, this balancing test presumptively would err on the 
side of investor protection. Similarly, in the absence of compelling evidence of changed 
                                                                                                                  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC2071_En&caseId=C961 (Barbadian holding structure for U.S. parent); Tokios Tokelés v. 
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Dissent, (Apr. 29, 2004), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC639_En&caseId=C220 (Lithuanian holding structure for Ukrainian parent against Ukraine); 
Universal Compression Int’l Holdings, S.L.U. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/9, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Prof. Brigitte Stern and Prof. Guido Santiago 
Tawil, Arbitrators, (May 20, 2011), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC2411_En&caseId=C1021 (according to news reports, Spanish holding structure for U.S. parent); 
Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, (Nov. 30, 2009) (U.K. holding structure for Russian parent). 
334.  See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Case No. 403/VERMERK/2001/CME, Partial 
Award, ¶ 426 (Sept. 13, 2001), http://italaw.com/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf (Dutch 
holding structure for U.S. parent); Mobil Corp. Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 198 (June 10, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC1510_En&caseId=C256; Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Dissent, (Apr. 29, 2004), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC639_En&caseId=C220 (Lithuanian holding structure for Ukrainian parent against Ukraine). 
335.  On the scope and importance of due diligence for treaty claims, see, for example, Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 333–38 (Sept. 11, 2007), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
=DC682_En&caseId=C252. 
336.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
337.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
338.  Reisman, supra note 30, at 41 (“Public international arbitration has evolved so differently from its 
private counterpart that analogies between the two forms of dispute resolution, while tempting, are 
perilous.”).  
339.  ILC Guidelines, supra note 317, princ. 10(c). 
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circumstances, it would hold the treaty parties to their bargain, even in the context of 
collective action, when faced with claims of investors having made a substantial capital 
investment in the host state economy.  
4. Survival of Investor Rights 
The “unilateral act” analysis explains not only why states generally cannot frustrate 
investor rights completely through withdrawal from investment treaties but also has broader 
significance for the question of how state parties to investment treaties can interpret, or 
modify, the investor rights contained in international investment agreements. Anthea 
Roberts’s landmark article Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The 
Dual Role of States has laid the groundwork for the conclusion that state parties to 
international investment agreements do have the ability to jointly engage in a dialogue with 
international investment tribunals about the scope of the obligations in their own investment 
treaties.340 The unilateral act analysis is broadly consistent with Professor Roberts’s analysis, 
but differs in limiting the ability of states to alter their commitments to a greater extent than 
Professor Roberts suggests.341 
Professor Roberts’s article assumes that international investment agreements bestow 
substantive and procedural rights upon covered investors.342 She explains that through 
international investment agreements, states delegate interpretive powers to international 
investment tribunals.343 By virtue of this delegation, tribunals maintain a “trustee-like 
status” for the state parties in resolving international disputes and as such have to interpret, 
and in the case of vague norms, create international norms.344 But “[a]s states remain the 
primary creators of international law, and are capable of modifying and interpreting their 
own treaties, they presumptively retain any lawmaking powers not expressly or impliedly 
delegated.”345 
Power and Persuasion proposes a middle ground approach between states being forced to 
exit or permitted to re-contract or delegitimize their investment treaty commitments.346 This 
middle ground is taken up by dialogue, “[g]iving both treaty parties and tribunals a voice . . . 
but neither a mandate to dictate.”347 In this dialogue, the treaty parties’ reasonableness in 
asserting a certain position in the context of a given dispute is a key guiding factor. This 
reasonableness is measured both by reference to the textual basis of the proffered 
                                            
340.  Roberts, supra note 58.  
341.  Centrally, the unilateral act basis disagrees with her statement, premised in the law of treaties, 
that “the assumption that, once given, investor rights cannot be withdrawn or changed . . . . is 
incorrect. Investor rights can be altered through various means, including interpretation, 
amendment, withdrawal, and termination.” Id. at 210. While all of these acts may have an impact 
on investor rights, as discussed above they certainly do not have such an impact immediately but 
must be assessed through the lens of reasonable reliance and changed circumstances critical to the 
unilateral act analysis.  
342.  Id. at 185. 
343.  Id. at 185–91. 
344.  Id. 
345.  Id. at 191. 
346.  Id. at 192–93. 
347.  Id. at 194. 
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interpretation and the timing at which it is raised.348 In cases of a reasonable interpretation 
asserted before the dispute arose, but potentially after the investment was made, the dialogue 
should lead to the adoption of the position espoused by the treaty parties even if it is not the 
most reasonable interpretation available. Unreasonable interpretations proffered prior to the 
dispute but after the investment was made would be presumptively valid because “[t]reaty 
parties have not represented that investor rights will never be revoked, amended, or 
interpreted.”349 
Power and Persuasion is fundamentally correct in rejecting the wholesale import of third-
party beneficiary law that would deprive treaty parties of any ability to modify investor rights 
set out in BITs prior to the expiry of the sunset period in the treaty. Such deprivation would 
completely handcuff state parties to the vagaries of investor-state tribunals without any 
prospective ability to course-correct their bargain and would transform these treaties into 
“suicide pacts.”350 Requiring such a result defies common sense. Where the investor’s reliance 
interest is small, and the interpretation adopted by the treaty parties is reasonable, 
modification of treaty rights must be possible for a sustainable system of investor protection 
to develop. Any other approach risks needlessly disenfranchising the treaty party that 
originally created the investor rights in the first place—and thus risks an entirely avoidable 
political backlash against the IIA treaty network as a whole. 
But Power and Persuasion falls prey to the allure of the law of treaties when it denies 
investors the benefit of reliance interests against unreasonable interpretations of investment 
treaties by the treaty parties so long as the interpretation is adopted prior to the outbreak of 
the dispute. As was the case with Venezuela, investors structured their investments in 
strategic sectors through BIT jurisdictions precisely to hedge against rising political risk.351 
In many instances, investors continue to make long-term capital expenditures and intensive 
investments precisely because of the availability of such a hedge.352 For example, an investor 
in Venezuela making a $200 million investment in the oil sector in 2000 employing a BIT 
structure would have seen nationalization of some projects in 2004, been faced with BIT 
treaty parties changing the scope of their undertaking to exclude oil sector investments in 
2005, and been completely expropriated in 2006. Is this forfeiture contemplated by Power and 
Persuasion consistent with the advertised purpose of BITs to enhance capital flows?353 Is this 
consistent with the principle of good faith? Hardly. 
Similarly, the framework of Power and Persuasion cannot account for the role of changed 
circumstances requiring a modification of the underlying bargain. Article 37 of the Vienna 
Convention, on which the article chiefly relies, “does not cover the suspension of obligations 
                                            
348.  See id. at 214. 
349.  Id. at 214. 
350.  See id. at 179. 
351.  See, e.g., Mobil Corp. Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId
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352.  See Elisabeth Eljuri & Clovis Treviño, Political Risk Management in Light of Venezuela’s Partial 
Nationalisation of the Oilfield Services Sector, 28 No. 3 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 375, 394–
95 (2010). 
353.  Compare Mobil Corp. Venezuela Holdings B.V., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27. 
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and rights afforded to third States or the situation where there is a change in 
circumstances.”354 It is not hard to imagine how the 2008 financial crisis could bring about 
modifications of exceptions to treaties jointly by the treaty parties—even in treaties currently 
excluding non-precluded measures clauses.355 These modifications would be necessary 
precisely because the earlier drafting plainly did not anticipate their need. For these 
circumstances, a textual reasonableness analysis will simply not suffice. 
Treating investor rights arising out of bilateral investment treaties as unilateral acts of 
state made pursuant to an international treaty can overcome these difficulties. The core of 
investor rights vest when the investment is made.356 In all situations except for exceptional 
changes in circumstances, the investor will be protected against a radical departure from 
treaty rights, such as the removal of the right to receive compensation for expropriation or the 
right to commence international arbitration proceedings.357 Any reasonable interpretation of 
the international commitments in light of the circumstances as they exist when an 
interpretation was proffered would prevail at this point.358 As there is greater reliance 
interest due to the acts of the investor, the scope of discretion of the host state to modify 
investor rights without investor consent shrinks considerably.359 The state acts from this 
point forward would be evidence to consider as part of an independent analysis of the most 
reasonable interpretation of the state’s undertaking in light of current circumstances at the 
time the dispute arose, but could no longer displace it.  
The optic of unilateral acts does not require that investor rights be interpreted 
restrictively. The ILC Guiding Principles set up a scheme of restrictive interpretation for non-
conventional unilateral acts.360 As the tribunal in Mobil v. Venezuela explained, the ILC 
regime is displaced when “unilateral acts are formulated in the framework and on the basis of 
a treaty.”361 In that case, the language of the undertaking itself, viewed in context and in 
light of its object and purpose and overall attending circumstances, reveals an interpretation 
that is most reasonable given the record of evidence.362 This most reasonable interpretation is 
the one to which the investor, vested with a direct right, is entitled. 
                                            
354.  VILLIGER, supra note 274, at 495. For a discussion of the application of rebus sic stantibus 
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358.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
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This approach again takes the rights of investors seriously. International investment 
agreements are a tool to reduce political risk for investors but they are not suicide pacts.363 
They thus do not perfectly fit the mold of either the law of third-party beneficiaries in the law 
of contracts or the law of treaties. Rather, by treating investor rights as arising out of 
unilateral declarations under BITs, the law treats investors as falling at a mid-point between 
both, protecting investor reliance and state freedom of action to address changed 
circumstances.  
B. Termination of the ICSID Convention  
Understanding consents to investors as unilateral declarations sheds light not only on the 
potential consequences of the termination of BITs, but also upon the termination by a state of 
the ICSID Convention. To the extent that rights have vested in investors due to the 
termination provision in the consent instrument of submitting claims to ICSID or due to 
reliance by the investor, termination of the ICSID Convention does not deprive those 
investors of the ability to commence arbitral claims at ICSID. To the extent an investor’s 
rights have not vested, for example because an investment was only ever made after 
termination of the ICSID Convention, good faith requires the denouncing host state to 
continue to permit recourse to ICSID arbitration insofar it has consented to it in an 
investment treaty if the host state has not received the consent of the home state to withdraw 
its consent for future investors.  
1. The ICSID Convention on Its Face Does Not Allow Frustration of 
Treaty Consent Instruments 
Articles 71 and 72 govern denunciation of the ICSID Convention.364 These articles are 
incompatible with an offer-and-acceptance model of consent.365 Neither provision textually 
supports the proposition that a denunciation of the ICSID Convention by itself withdraws or 
voids outstanding unilateral consent instruments.  
On their face, both provisions support the “unilateral act” model of consent. Under the 
“unilateral act” model, the state cannot arbitrarily withdraw its consent to arbitration.366 As 
discussed above, a host state can no longer withdraw its consent once it has vested rights in 
investors either by its terms or by reliance as considered in light of all relevant 
circumstances.367 Per force, a state’s withdrawal of a unilateral act must be arbitrary if the 
state remains under an independent treaty obligation to extend that unilateral act to 
qualifying investors. The withdrawal from the ICSID Convention, if conceived of as a means 
to withdraw existing consents to arbitration, is precisely the kind of arbitrary act to which 
international principles of good faith will not give effect. 
                                            
363.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
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Article 72 most clearly supports this conception. It states that denunciation 
shall not affect the rights or obligations under this Convention of that State or of any of 
its constituent subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State arising out of 
the consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such notice was 
received by the depositary.368 
The natural reading of Article 72 is that consent is given independently by the State (or any 
of its constituent subdivisions or agencies) and that this independent consent remains 
unaffected by denunciation of the ICSID Convention.369 
In the second edition of his influential commentary of the ICSID Convention, Professor 
Schreuer rejects this reading of Article 72, proffered in the Preliminary Comment, because 
the phrase ‘given by one of them’ relates to the denouncing State, its constituent 
subdivisions or agencies and its nationals. It does not relate to the relationship between 
the host State and the investor. This phrase would not support a theory that consent 
offered by the host State but not accepted by the investor shall remain unaffected by 
the denunciation.370 
He further explains that the “phrase ‘given by one of them’ ensures that a national of a 
denouncing state who accepts the offer of consent in a BIT before the notice of denunciation 
will continue to enjoy the rights and obligations resulting from the consent.”371 
Professor Schreuer’s construction of Article 72 does not rebut the reasonable, common 
sense reading of Article 72 that the consent given by the State is not affected by denunciation 
irrespective of what the investor has or has not yet done. Assuming that “given by one of 
them” relates “to the denouncing state, its constituent subdivisions or agencies and its 
nationals,” as Professor Schreuer submits, it still remains the unilateral act of consenting by 
“one of them” to which Article 72 applies.372 Had the drafters intended what Professor 
Schreuer submits, Article 72 would have had to read “given by one of them and a national of 
another Contracting State or another Contracting State.”  
This interpretation is confirmed contextually in the last sentence of Article 25(1), which 
states, “[w]hen the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally.”373 “Consent” precisely is not the term used for an accepted offer of arbitration, 
but the term used for the unilateral act of consenting.374 In Article 72, “consent” is this 
unilateral act of consenting that is addressed.375 By contextual analysis, the Convention could 
not be clearer: if a state wishes to withdraw its consent to arbitration, it must do so according 
to the terms of the consent instrument, not through denunciation of the ICSID Convention. 
Put differently, consent remains an obligation of the state that can only be withdrawn on its 
terms.  
This contextual analysis fits hand-in-glove with the unilateral act analysis of how investor 
rights vest. The ILC Guidelines provide that such acts “cannot be revoked arbitrarily,” and 
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premises this obligation on the principle of good faith.376 Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention precisely foresees the possibility of a unilateral withdrawal of consent by a host 
state prior to the investor giving its consent.377 The principle of good faith requires, as the 
ILC guiding principles elucidate, that the revocation or withdrawal of consent “cannot be 
[done] arbitrarily.”378 The unilateral withdrawal from ICSID as a means to revoke investor 
rights either when the rights of the investor have already vested or when the home state of 
potential investors has not consented to it is “arbitrary” as discussed above. Article 72 thus 
spells out what is implicit in Article 25(1): such an arbitrary act will not be given effect. 
2. The Drafting History of the ICSID Convention Confirms that 
Standing Consent to Arbitration Cannot Be Frustrated by 
Termination of the Convention 
The drafting history of the ICSID Convention confirms the textual interpretation of 
Articles 71 and 72 that termination of the ICSID Convention does not affect the rights and 
obligations arising out of consents to arbitration in BITs or investment legislation. The 
drafting intent is particularly apparent in discussions led by the German and Austrian 
delegates who expressly sought to protect their BIT programs from a host state’s potential 
unilateral withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. It is not undercut by the exchange 
between Mr. Broches and Mr. Gutirrez Cano relied upon by proponents of the offer-and-
acceptance model. 
The key difference between the offer-and-acceptance model and the unilateral act model 
concerns whether consent referenced in Article 72 of the ICSID Convention is the unilateral 
act of the state consenting to ICSID jurisdiction, or whether it refers to a specific agreement 
to arbitrate between the host state and an investor. The drafting history of the ICSID 
Convention does not support the offer-and-acceptance approach but rather confirms that the 
consent in question referenced in both the last sentence of Article 25(1) and Article 72 of the 
ICSID Convention was in fact the unilateral act of the host state. 
Because of the extremely short discussion of the denunciation provisions proper during the 
negotiations of the ICSID Convention, the first step is to look to the extensive drafting history 
of Article 25(1).379 The consent provision of the ICSID Convention was drafted at a time when 
contractual consents to investor state arbitration were still the norm, but after the first BIT 
had entered into force.380 An early note to the Executive Directors of the Bank already 
anticipated this potential development, stating that “once a State had voluntarily agreed to 
                                            
376.  ILC Guidelines, supra note 317, princ. 10. 
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submit a specific dispute or group of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Centre this agreement 
would be a binding international obligation.”381 
The importance attached to an international obligation to arbitrate through a standing 
state consent is apparent throughout the drafting history of the Convention. In response to a 
preliminary working draft of the Convention describing consent as “an undertaking in writing 
to have recourse to conciliation and arbitration,” the German delegate inquired about how 
this language might apply to consent through investment treaties.382 The first draft of the 
Convention reflected the comment.383 It stated that the consent of any party to a dispute to 
the jurisdiction of the Center may be evidenced by: 
(i) a prior written undertaking of such party which provides that there shall be 
recourse, pursuant to the terms on this Convention, to conciliation or arbitration 
(hereinafter referred to as an undertaking); 
(ii) submission of a dispute by such party to the Center;  
or 
(iii) acceptance by such party of jurisdiction in respect of a dispute submitted to the 
Center by another party.384 
Due to a concern regarding subpart (iii), the drafting language was later changed to a 
formulation closer to the current Article 25, which no longer expressly refers to “a prior 
written undertaking of such party.”385 Within months of circulation of the second draft, the 
Austrian delegation noted that the change now obscured the fact that states consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction through general submission.386 The remaining drafting history of the ICSID 
Convention reflects the fact that the comment of the Austrian delegation was taken into 
account and that the agreement reflected in Article 25 was that each party could indeed 
submit an independent consent to ICSID arbitration.387 This common understanding is 
reflected in the last sentence of Article 25 discussed in the previous section.388  
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writing. It may be given either before or after the dispute has arisen. Consent by a political 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require approval of the State.”). 
386.  Letter addressed to the Bank from the Federal Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Austria, (Nov. 
13, 1963), in 2-2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 670.  
387.  Preliminary Draft, supra note 256, at 203; Broches Memorandum Jan. 19, 1965, supra note 53, at 
956.  
388.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
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It is against this background that the drafters of the ICSID Convention discussed the 
implications that termination of the ICSID Convention had upon consent to ICSID 
arbitration. The discussions took place a mere sixteen days prior to the opening for signature 
of the draft Convention.389 The first exchange confirmed that a under a contractual 
agreement between a host state and the investor for a twenty-year period, “that State would 
still be bound to submit its disputes with that company under that agreement to the 
Centre.”390 The next exchange concerned a contractual “arbitration clause which could be 
terminated by one of the parties” with an undefined duration.391 In such a case, “the 
jurisdiction of the Centre would come to an end on termination of the clause.”392 So far, the 
discussion is completely consistent with the unilateral act interpretation. 
Immediately following this exchange, Mr. Broches and Mr. Gutierrez Cano interjected 
with what is critically relied upon by proponents of the offer-and-acceptance model: 
Mr. Gutierrez Cano said that Article 73 in the new text was lacking a time limit beyond 
which the Convention would cease to apply. Unless time limit was introduced States 
would be bound indefinitely. He had in mind the case in which there was no agreement 
between the State and the foreign investor but only a general declaration on the part of 
the State in favor of submission of claims to the Centre and a subsequent withdrawal 
from the Convention by that State before any claim had been in fact submitted to the 
Centre. Would the Convention still compel the State to accept the jurisdiction of the 
Centre? 
Mr. Broches replied that a general statement of the kind mentioned by Mr. Gutierrez 
Cano would not be binding on the State which made it until it had been accepted by an 
investor. If the State withdraws its unilateral statement by denouncing the Convention 
before it has been accepted by any investor, no investor could later bring a claim before 
the Centre. If, however, the unilateral offer of the State has been accepted before 
denunciation of the Convention, then disputes arising between the State and the 
investor after the date of denunciation will still be within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre.393 
The call of the question reveals the problem with relying upon Mr. Broches’s answer as a 
full endorsement of the offer-and-acceptance model. Mr. Gutierrez Cano inquired whether the 
Convention could compel the state to accept jurisdiction of the Centre.394 As the exchange 
immediately preceding it had made clear, the question about whether the consent instrument 
was in force principally had to be determined by interpretation of that consent instrument.395 
Mr. Broches’s answer proceeds on the assumption of the immediately preceding discussion 
that the “general statement” did not contain a defined duration and was in fact terminable at 
will.396 This is not the case in the context of treaty consents to arbitration, which are subject 
to sunset periods as a matter of the treaty itself.397  
                                            
389.  See Mr. Broches’s Remark of March 3, 1965, in 2-2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION, 
supra note 38, at 1009–10 [hereinafter Broches’s Remark].  
390.  Id. 
391.  Id. at 1010. 
392.  Id.  
393.  Broches’s Remark, supra note 389, at 1009–10 (paragraph numbering omitted). 
394.  Broches’s Remark, supra note 389, at 1010. 
395.  Id. 
396.  Id. at 1009–10. 
397.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
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In any event, Mr. Broches’ statement expressly endorses rather than contradicts the 
“unilateral-act” model: “if the State withdraws its unilateral statement.”398 The choice of 
words was no accident, as consent was expressly and continuously considered akin to a 
unilateral act submitting to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.399 
Mr. Broches’s comment contemplates that the issue be addressed under the law of unilateral 
acts, which permits revocation of unilateral acts unless the revocation is arbitrary. This is 
precisely the conception of the unilateral act model and not that of the offer-and-acceptance 
model. The key difference is that the unilateral act model requires the revocation to occur in 
good faith. The offer-and-acceptance excuses, and in fact invites, bad faith. This preference is 
not borne textually or contextually—and, inviting bad faith, is hardly a desirable incentive. 
IV. Conclusion 
The current investment protection infrastructure was set up to be a lasting part of the new 
public international legal architecture following the end of the Cold War.400 It was created in 
part to repel the state from its position of hegemony over international economic law.401 Its 
creators endowed it with resilience against short-term global policy shifts such that the 
international legal mechanism to provide political risk protection does not itself fall prey to 
political risk.402 
The key premise of this new system has been to provide rights to international investors 
without entering states into privity with them. Investment treaties providing a standing 
consent to international arbitration are at heart of this project. As conclusively evidenced by 
the consent provision, these treaties bestow rights on international investors. 
The termination of investment treaties presents hard questions. On the one hand, it is the 
classic weapon of the state wishing to escape the regulation of international law. It is a key 
element of the voluntarist conception of international law, reducing international law to the 
“will” of the state against which that international law is invoked.403 On the other hand, 
investment protection treaties were precisely set up to create a stable and quasi-permanent 
system of protection for international investors.  
Existing scholarship has erred on the side of withdrawal rights. It has done so by 
reintroducing privity analysis into the international investment system. This reintroduction 
of privity allows scholars to posit that without the investors’ affirmative act to consent to 
arbitration under a BIT in writing, the state retains its full rights of action. This analysis 
does not take into account the crucial role of the lack of privity for investment law in general 
and as such fails to explain the lack of immediate consequence, or lack thereof, of termination 
of investment agreements. 
                                            
398.  Broches’s Remark, supra note 389, at 1009–10 (emphasis added). 
399.  Broches, supra note 38, at 3–7.  
400.  See supra Part I.B. 
401.  See supra Part I.B. 
402.  See supra Part I.B. 
403.  See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 159, at 417–20. For a further discussion of various legal theory 
approaches to international law and their impact on the role of international law in the resolution of 
political risk disputes, see Sourgens, supra note 3.  
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This Article has shown that the most appropriate conception of investment law treats the 
commitments of host states as unilateral acts made directly vis-à-vis the investor. This 
approach takes investor rights seriously. It further takes seriously that the relationship is not 
one of privity, but one of unilateral action. This paradigm has allowed a more nuanced picture 
to develop that places premium on proof of reliance of the investment protection 
infrastructure. This position has ultimately placed investment law between the contractual 
model of third-party beneficiaries and the offer-and-acceptance approach. By doing so, it has 
demonstrated that investment law has built in a fail-safe against a momentary change of 
heart without binding state participants to (economic) suicide pacts. 
